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Using unique matched data on SME-bank relationships from 19 European countries, we examine the 
effects of bank-level market power on SME finance. We show novel evidence that bank market power 
at disaggregate level reduces SMEs’ access to bank finance and worsens their credit constraints. Whilst, 
banking market concentration improves credit supply to SMEs. The unfavourable market power effect 
is stronger for SMEs who are more informationally opaque, riskier and more dependent on external 
finance. We also show supporting evidence on Information-based Hypothesis where with greater 
market power, banks are more likely to engage in relationship lending.  
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1 Introduction  
Unlike many other industries, financial institutions play various roles and multiple functions in an 
economy. For example, banks are the implementers of a sovereign’s monetary policies, for-profit 
organisations, and also the intermediations which provide credit and liquidity, risk reduction and 
maturity transformation processes to the markets. Of these unique roles, studies have garnered 
increasing interest in the banking effects on microeconomic agents. 
The debate on the effects of bank competition or bank market power on the credit supply to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is far from settled. Conventional competition models 
suggest that market power has an unfavourable effect on customers in many ways but due to the special 
role of information, market power of banks may have dubious effects than other industries on their 
customers. European SMEs are ideal for the study because of their scales in the European Economic 
Area (EEA) countries and bank finance is still the dominant source of financing amongst others 
(Siedschlag, 2014). Also, prior studies have shown that SME’s access to finance is a crucial determinant 
of its ability to survive and develop, and it aggregately affects a country’s economic stability and growth. 
For example, SME’s financing fulfilment is a crucial determinant of launching new products and 
improving knowledge transfer (Ayyagari et al., 2011) and SME’s access to finance is a key to achieve 
higher employment growth (Campello and Larrain, 2014).  
Empirical evidence has not consistently concluded the impacts of bank market power on SME 
credit availability because of the mixture of theoretical conjectures, different samples used and distinct 
interpretations of bank market power, in existing literature. In this paper, we investigate for the first 
time in literature how bank market power at disaggregate level affects the financing constraints of SMEs 
in 19 European countries (18 EU member states and Iceland) by adopting a unique matched firm-bank 
database. 
Our main findings suggest that bank market power at disaggregate level impedes SMEs’ access 
to finance, worsens their credit constraint, and bank competition promotes credit supply to SMEs if the 
results are translated into country level. The unfavourable market power effect is stronger for SMEs 
which are more informationally opaque, riskier and more dependent on external finance. Although, 
SME credit constraint is alleviated in the banking markets which are more concentrated, such an effect 
is more favourable in explaining firm’s probability of obtaining finance but less economically 
significant in explaining the usage of bank debt. Our results show supporting evidence to the Market 
Power Hypothesis (MPH) where lower competition increases financial constraints but reject the validity 
of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP). We also show supporting evidence on the 
Information-based Hypothesis (IBH) where with a greater market power, banks are more likely to 
engage in relationship lending as shown by more long-term lending between bank and SMEs, 
suggesting that two competing banking theories are coexistent. Our findings are robust to several 
econometric tests, especially the endogeneity concerns. On one hand, one might argue that there could 
exist unobservable factors either at macroeconomic, bank, or firm-level that could affect both bank 
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market power (and/or control variables) and SME finance. On the other, there could be a 
contemporaneous reverse causality concern in our equations, where an SME’s access to finance or bank 
debt ratio might determine the market level of its bank creditor or other control variables included in 
the equations. To empirically address these endogeneity concerns and further validate our findings, we 
perform robustness tests by using lagged explanatory variable, and employing instrumental variable 
estimations and Generalised Method of Moments estimations for a dynamic specification with 
endogeneity corrections on both dynamic and static variables, for example. Our results are robust to a 
wide range of such tests.  
Our research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we make a distinction 
between bank market power and bank concentration effects on SMEs by accounting for the fact that 
banking market concentration is an inappropriate measure of bank market power (e.g. Bolt and 
Humphrey, 2015). Second, our unique matched data employed allows us to test the direct and 
heterogenous effects of market power at bank-level on SMEs in a country at a disaggregate level, where 
the country-level measures are widely criticised previously (e.g. Ergungor, 2004; Ratti et al., 2008). 
Third, we provide more intuitive and objective empirical evidence in relevant research areas by using 
objective indicators of SMEs’ bank credit usage rather than indirect proxies such as the sensitivity of 
SME performance on bank debt usage (e.g. Agostino and Trivieri, 2010), cash-investment sensitivity 
(e.g. Ryan et al. 2014), and subjective self-assessed financial obstacle measures (e.g. Beck et al. 2004). 
Fourth, unlike Love and Peria (2014) and Mudd (2013), our study examines not only the probability of 
access to finance but also the quantity associated to address the credit rationing of SMEs. Fifth, different 
from most previous studies (e.g. Ryan et al. 2014) that only adopt country-level bank market power or 
concentration measures with an assumption of exogeneity, we use unique matched bank-SME data and 
address the endogeneity concerns in several ways to enhance the validity of results. Additionally, we 
present several tests that account for different industry-level inherent financing habits, and examine the 
bank market power effects on bank loan structure in terms of maturity. Last, our study employs a rich 
cross-country panel containing nearly 80,000 firms, much representative than most of the existing 
literature (e.g. Love and Peria, 2014; Leon, 2015). Benefit from financial reporting data and cross-
country nature, this rich sample allows us to comprehensively control for SME credit supply 
heterogeneities, SMEs’ credit demand and financing capability. To our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical study using matched firm-bank microeconomic-level data to examine the effects of bank 
market power on SME financing constraints and debt usage in a cross-country setting, and to assess the 
roles of information opaqueness and debt dependency on moderating the bank market power effects. 
Our study also contributes to the literature by empirically showing that the two competing theories 
(MPH and IBH) actually coexist in a practical European context.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief summary of relevant empirical 
literature and theories. Section 3 illustrates the data and research methodology. Section 4 presents the 




2 Literature Review 
2.1 Bank market power and SME finance 
In the pace of globally springing up of SME surveys available in recent years, studies have started to 
match them with other banking market databases. Using the World Bank Enterprises Survey (WBES) 
data spanning unevenly from 2002 to 2010, Love and Peria (2014) adopt non-structural bank 
competition measures and show that the low level of competition diminishes SMEs’ access to finance 
while the structural measures are not significant predictors. Another study by Mudd (2013), which 
employs a smaller fraction of the WBES containing a sample of one-off 33 countries, draws similar 
conclusions for both structural and non-structural measures. Both studies capture the financing 
condition of an SME by a binary variable that is equal to one if an SME has access to finance. Beck et 
al. (2004) measure SME financing obstacles at micro-level by directly asking the level of 
problematicness of financing for the operation and growth of the business. A 74-country international 
study (WBES) supports the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) that bank market 
concentration increases SMEs’ obstacles to obtaining finance in the countries with low level of 
economic and institutional development. However, the validity of the concentration measure is 
questionable because smaller countries in their studies in nature have higher concentration ratio than 
large countries due to the inconsistent size of economies (e.g. Belize vs. France). Using a recent wave 
of WBES covering 69 developing and emerging countries, Leon (2015) advances Beck et al.’s (2004) 
study by classifying credit constraints into self-discouragement and application rejection. They show 
that in developing countries, SME financing constraints, in the senses of reduced lending standards and 
discouragement, declined in countries where banking markets are more competitive and such results 
are only valid when non-structural measures are used but not valid for concentration measures. Han et 
al. (2009) produce similar findings using a large U.S. dataset that low risk borrowers are less likely to 
be self-discouraged in less competitive banking markets. Rice and Strahan (2010) adopt the same 
database as Han et al. (2009) in the U.S. and show that in states with more competition, small firms 
depend more heavily on bank finance and are associated with lower level of credit constraints. 
For some non-U.S. single country studies, Chong et al. (2013) find that joint-stock banks (less 
market power) have higher credit supply to SMEs compared with stated-owned or city commercial 
banks (more market power). Similar conclusion is made in Italy (Agostino and Trivieri, 2010) by using 
financial reporting data instead of surveys. Also using financial statement data, Ryan et al. (2014) apply 
a panel data of 118,000 firms. By altering Fazzari et al.’s (1988) cash-investment sensitivity model, 
they show that Lerner Index has a positive effect on SMEs investment, and the sensitivity of dependence 
of investment on internal financing is stronger in less competitive banking markets. 
Above studies in general support the conjecture that bank competition improves credit 
availability of SMEs. Firms perceive or experience higher levels of financing constraints, e.g. lack of 
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access to finance, application rejection, discouragement, credit rationing and relatively high dependence 
on internal funds for investment, in less competitive banking markets, supporting the SCP Hypothesis 
or the Market Power Hypothesis. 
Another set of studies emphases on the unfavourable effects of bank competition on SME credit 
supply. Ratti et al. (2008) adopt the cash-investment sensitivity model and show that in 14 European 
countries, increased concentration as a proxy of decreased competition in the banking sector relaxes 
SMEs’ dependence on internal fund for investment. Alvarez and Bertin (2016) show that bank 
competition, proxied by national level Boone Indicator (Boone, 2008), reduces credit supply to meeting 
SME credit demand, and the impact is greater for SMEs that are smaller or lower in tangibility in a 
sample comprising of six Latin America countries. This result is consistent with the information-based 
Hypothesis; but the usage of Boone indicator at country level may not be ideal since unlike Europe, 
countries such as Brazil and Mexico in their sample are relatively large where regional bank competition 
disparities can be significant. 
Study by Zarutskie (2006) is also in favour of the Information-based Hypothesis, showing that 
increased competition of the U.S. banking markets through a Branching Act that encourages interstate 
banking activities led to newly formed SMEs experiencing higher level of financing constraints with 
less access to external debt. Two other recent single-country studies, Abubakr and Esposito (2012) and 
Tacneng (2014) support the Information-based Hypothesis as well in the UK and Philippine. In addition, 
Baert and Vennet (2008) report that banking market concentration expands firms’ access to long-term 
debt because relationship banking serves to mitigate information asymmetries and to reduce agency 
cost in a rich sample containing 12,049 firms from 39 mostly advanced countries.  
All these studies have evidenced that bank market power promotes credit availability for SMEs, 
where financing constraints identified in these studies are defined as a greater sensitivity of investment 
to internal funds or a low level of debt usage. However, due to the reason of the shortage of loan level 
data in non-survey-based studies, financial constraints such as self-assessment on constraint level, 
discouragement or application rejection are not observable. Although these two camps of studies which 
provide contrasting conclusions, some suggest that the relation does not necessarily qualify for linearity 
(e.g. Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2011) or two contrasting hypotheses could 
coexist (e.g. Han et al., 2017). Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009), for example, show that market power is 
negatively related to credit availability only when the Lerner Index is used but concentration ratio 
presents opposite conclusion. 
 
2.2 Relevant theories 
Due to the facts that SMEs have lack of formal financial and audit information, credit history, and low 
information disclosure requirements, they are more informationally opaque than many other types of 
borrowers (e.g. large firms). Hence, banks face more information asymmetries when identifying their 
credibility (Griffins, 2002). SMEs are also more likely to be credit rationed in loan markets with 
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imperfect information when creditors (banks) have problems in differentiating between borrower’s 
credit risk level, and because of their limited liability subject to loan default as well especially when 
they are less capable of providing collaterals (Ghosh et al., 1999). Banks consume multi-resources to 
reduce the possibility of loan impairments, but SMEs are low in transparency, resulting in high 
screening and monitoring costs for banks, and therefore lending activities face a greater degree of 
uncertainties. Furthermore, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) state that the moral hazard dilemma is an ex-
post behaviour happening when entrepreneurs intentionally act differently after the contract being 
issued by exerting and exercising deviated effort and risk-level. Borrowers, especially SMEs, are 
incentivised to behave in a speculative manner because the profit functions between borrowers and 
creditors are different. Borrower’s expected return is an increasing function against risk level but bank’s 
expected return is a decreasing function on project risk. This dilemma can be alleviated when the 
borrower does not deliberately deviate from the original proposals (e.g. high reputation, better 
investment information disclosure), when the after-contract activities can be properly monitored and 
when the collaterals can provide high guaranties to banks. However, all of these do not always fit under 
the context of SME lending.  
Above mentioned literature has suggested that SME lending activities involve significant risk 
(especially credit risk) and therefore positively associated with the risk-level that banks taking on. 
Empirically, Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009) have proven that when banks taking on more credit risk, 
reference SMEs’ credit constraints relaxed. However, evidence on the impact of bank market power on 
bank risk-taking (including credit risk) are also fairly mixed. The competition-stability hypothesis (CSH) 
indicates that an increase (decrease) in bank market power leads to banks taking more (less) risk and 
hence involving more in high risk activities including SME lending; while, the competition-fragility 
hypothesis (CFH) suggests the opposite direction. Both hypotheses have a wide range of supporting 
evidence; empirically, Leroy and Lucotte (2017), Soedarmono et al. (2013), Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) 
and Akins et al. (2016) support the CSH, and Forssbeck and Shehzad (2016), Jimenez et al. (2007) and 
Agoraki et al. (2011) support the CFH. There are also studies (Lapteacru, 2017 and Fu et al., 2014) 
suggesting the co-existence of two hypotheses, and Kick and Prieto (2015) show that market power has 
no impact on bank risk-taking level. 
Ruckes (2004) proposes a ‘competition - credit standard hypothesis’ that could also explain the 
relation between bank market power and SME credit availability, suggesting that improved (worsen) 
economic outlook leads to creditors competing fiercer (lesser) over price (market power) and reduced 
(increased) borrowers’ default probability. Thus, lending standards are softened (strengthened) 
accordingly, resulting in firms with higher risk or lower capability of accessing to finance being granted 
bank finance easier or cheaper (harder or more expensive). Demiroglu et al. (2012) extend Ruckes’ 
hypothesis by considering the effect to a more specific group of firms. They show that the effect of 
tighter lending standards is associated with a higher margin of decline in private firms’ access to finance 
compared to public firms, and private firms are significantly less likely to access to new lines of bank 
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credit when banks are tightening lending standards than are public firms, suggesting that tighter lending 
standards are associated with banks being more selective in credit supply to less transparent firms such 
as SMEs. 
Boyd and De Nicolo (BDN, 2005) propose a contrasting conjecture based on the assumption 
that banks’ lending market power is a result of their technology advantage on loan screening and 
monitoring. Banks with relative technology disadvantage spend more and consume longer period on 
screening loan applications; costs are therefore transferred to borrowers as a result of incurring 
financing obstacles although these banks may wish to mitigate this disadvantage by taking more risk 
such as alleviating lending standards and reducing expenses on monitoring and screening to prevent 
from market share reduction. While, banks with lending technology advantage have more discourse 
power over the lending market, and they shift their cost efficiency to credit worthy clients by reducing 
interest or non-interest costs in order to keep increasing their market shares for long-term prosperity. 
Hence, such a conjecture implies that bank market power resulted from technology advantage would 
be positively related to the amount of credit available to creditworthy borrower such as those with better 
credit rating scores. 
Furthermore, there are two most widely acknowledged, albeit contrasting hypotheses in 
literature, the Market Power Hypothesis (MPH) and the Information-based Hypothesis (IBH), on the 
effect bank market power on SME’s access to credit. The MPH conjectures that, under the conventional 
industrial organisation theory, market power enables firms to engage in anticompetitive behaviours (e.g. 
Vatiero, 2010). Under the banking context, market power could result in restricted loan supply, selective 
avoidance and manipulated lending rates, thereby intensifying borrowers’ financing constraints. It is 
worth noting that the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) illustrates similar results as the 
MPH, but it hypothesises that market structure influences bank conducts and therefore influences bank 
performance. Leading banks’ profitability increase when the market is highly concentrated because of 
the collusion behaviour and thus results in higher oligopoly rents and higher credit constraints to 
borrowers (Bikker and Bos, 2008). However, the SCP defines the market power of a banking market 
by the structure or assets concentration level of the market, as pointed out by Carbo-Valverde et al. 
(2009) that the theoretical framework of the SCP derived from oligopoly theory only holds in a Cournot 
setting but not robust in alternative settings (Lau, 1982) and for banking industry where existing studies 
have widely rejected the assumption of Cournot conducts (e.g. Berg and Kim, 1994). Moreover, Berger 
(1995) suggests that the empirical findings of the SCP might not be persuasive since the positive 
relationship between concentration and monopoly profit could be biased due to its high correlation with 
other variables. The independence of bank market power from banking market concentration has also 
been empirically proved by Lapteacru (2014) and Bolt and Humphrey (2015). For all these reasons, we 
disentangle bank-level market power effect from country-level banking market concentration. Although 
it is not the main purpose of this study, we still examine if concentration improves SMEs access to 
credit. The idea is that it could be easier for governing authorities to supervise and regulate banks’ 
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activities in a banking market that is highly concentrated, therefore preventing them from anti-
competitive behaviour, alleviating information asymmetries between creditors and borrowers, in order 
to promote credit supply to SMEs, known as ‘Easy-supervision Hypothesis’. Gonzalez and Gonzalez 
(2008) provide evidence that firm’s external finance usage is increased with greater bank concentration, 
and concentration benefits for better creditor protection to reduce the agency cost of debt between 
shareholders and debt holders. 
In contrast to MPH, IBH (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) conjectures that in the presence of 
information asymmetries and agency costs, market power incentivises banks to invest in soft or private 
information acquisition and to build lending relationships that reduce the information asymmetries and 
agency costs between lenders and borrowers, and thereby allows banks to efficiently internalise the 
costs of collecting such information, to extract informational rents in subsequent periods and to promote 
access to finance especially for informationally opaque firms such as SMEs. In addition, Ergungor 
(2004) extends the study of Boot and Thakor (2000) and proposes a view that bank's lending techniques 
are either relationship-based or transaction-based. In a more competitive banking market, bank’s 
profitability is reduced from both lending techniques but the negative effect is stronger for transaction 
lending, and thus banks are encouraged to shift to relationship lending, resulting in reduced SME 
financing constraints. 
We have so far reviewed some representative relevant studies, discovered very inconsistent 
empirical results and analysed the theoretical reasons behind. Our study distinguishes the effects 
between disaggregate level bank market power and macroeconomic level concentration and examines 
how bank market power at microeconomic level affects SME’s access to finance, debt usage and capital 
structure and what hypothesis the evidence reflects. We also test if the impacts of bank market power 
vary across different firm, banking market and macroeconomic heterogeneities. 
 
3 Data, Variables, and Model Specification 
3.1 Data source and matching 
To overcome the weaknesses of many SME survey data, such as low response rates (e.g. SME Finance 
Monitor), small sample size (e.g. Cambridge Centre for Business Research) and cross-sectional nature 
(e.g. Small Business Survey), we collect firm information from BvD Amadeus database in which 99% 
of the samples are private firms. Due to the low quality of SME accounting information in the full 
Amadeus subscription (e.g. non-genuine values), we use the sub-subscription of Amadeus. SMEs are 
defined as those firms which have less than 250 employees and less than €50 million turnover 1 
(European Commission). 
                                                          
1 Estimation is used when such information is not available by running basic regressions and multipliers amongst 
turnovers, total assets and employees by two-digit NACE1 and UK SIC 07 industry code. We also exclude sample 
firms which do not meet the criteria in some particular ways by screening the samples on their accounting 
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We collect bank level accounting data from Fitch Connect and bank specialisation data from 
Orbis Bankscope (now BankFocus). Bank accounting data can be directly matched with firm data but 
market power variables need full bank data to generate, including those which do not have relationships 
with the SMEs in this sample2. To control for different economic and time-series heterogeneities, we 
collect macro-economic and banking market data from The World Bank, interest rate data from 
European Commission (AMECO) and Eurostat and other data from European Central Bank (ECB) 
Datawarehouse and The Heritage Foundation Index. Data are matched between firm and bank through 
country code and year. 
We follow existing literature (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2019; Marco, 2019; Barbiero et al., 2016; 
Ferrando et al., 2015; Ongena et al., 2015; Vigneron et al., 2016; Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu, 2011 
and Giannetti and Ongena, 2012) to match an SME-bank relationship at a disaggregate level. This 
approach is by far known as the most appropriate way to explore bank firm relationship for SMEs with 
an absence of loan-level data and, it has been widely used by European Central Bank, European 
Investment Bank, Centre for Economic Policy Research, etc. since 2015. Same as above literature, we 
collect creditor information from Kompass to match a pair of SME and bank. The bank-firm relationship 
in Kompass is defined as a firm’s primary bank as the most preferred short-term and long-term bank 
debt lender, which also provides services of depositing, cash management and others. Such a firm-bank 
relationship has been found to be very sticky and bank switching behaviour is very rare in EEA countries 
(Ongena and Smith, 2001; Chodorow-Reich, 2014), particularly in the Amadeus database (Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2019; Giannetti and Ongena, 2012 and Marco, 2019). In addition, bank debt in European 
countries is the most important source of SME finance, and in consistent with the literature above, 
SMEs’ debt financing data from Amadeus is a valid proxy of lending from their main banks. SMEs 
may over-report or hide the identity of their main banks for strategic reasons (Diamond, 1991 and Yosha, 
1995) but Kompass has access to credit registries information, making strategic reporting of bank 
relationship becoming pointless (Giannetti & Ongena, 2012 and Brown, 2009). Where sample firms 
report multiple main banks, we specify the first one for data matching because as instructed by Kompass, 
ranking follows the order of importance of financing. Empirical studies, e.g. Giannetti and Ongena 
(2012), Marco (2019), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2019) and Ferrando et al. (2015) have shown that in this 
database, there is no evidence that firms with multiple relationships tend to report their preferred ones 
for reputational or other reasons.  
                                                          
standards, legal forms, status, industries, creditor information and activity locations (e.g. crown dependencies). 
More sampling details are available from the authors on request. 
2 We consider only commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks for generating market power variables 
in the full bank database and for the bank-firm matching process. 
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Amongst all the banks manually matched3 with sample SMEs as their primary banks in 19 EEA 
countries4, there are some banks serving as few as 5 SMEs5, Barclays plc serves as the primary bank 
for 4,879 SMEs and a typical bank works as a primary bank for 143 firms with a median of 25 in our 
sample. Our final sample consists of 3,349 banks where 533 of them are matched with 78,531 SMEs 
between 2007 and 2015 in 19 EEA countries. In terms of firm-year observations, British, French, 
Spanish and German SMEs contribute to 79.5% of the total observations, and 32% of the sample SMEs 
operate in wholesale and retail sector with another 24% in manufacturing sector (Table 1). 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Following Love and Peria (2012), Mudd (2013) and Leon (2015), we define access to finance, A2F, as 
a dummy where it is coded as one if an SME’s total debt is more than 5% of its total assets. Similar to 
Love and Peria (2014), our descriptive statistics show that about 65% of observations have 5% more 
total debt ratio with a standard deviation of 0.48. In following robustness tests, we also define alternative 
dummy variables to measure SME access to finance as ‘1%+ bank debt’ and ‘10%+ bank debt’. In 
addition, we use continuous variable ‘Total debt ratio (TDR)’ to measure the ratio of total debt scaled 
by total assets by following Daskalakis et al. (2017), Ayyagari et al. (2016); Bougheas et al. (2006); 
Sufi (2009) and Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2008).  
Tables 2 and 3 report the distributions of these two key variables across countries and industries 
and over time where the statistics of ‘Total debt ratio (TDR)’ are weighted by total assets of SMEs. 
‘A2F’ in the regression analysis is interpreted as the likelihood of access to finance and ‘Total debt ratio’ 
is the real level of financing. These two variables capture the financing constraints of SMEs after 
controlling for the heterogeneities in regards to credit demand, credit supply and firms’ capabilities of 
obtaining finance. Table 2 shows that for SMEs in some countries, the patterns of percentage of SMEs 
access to finance and total debt ratio are not always consistent, advocating the necessity of 
distinguishing the measures from the viewpoints of probability of access to finance and debt finance 
usage. Table 3 shows that SMEs’ dependence on finance varies significantly across industries and we 
address this issue in the following robustness tests by considering industry-level differentiation and loan 
growth rates. 
                                                          
3 We manually match two databases instead of using text-processing software such as OpenRefine (used in 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2019) for the considerations of accuracy, different reporting formats (e.g. abbreviation, 
Unicode), actual lending activities (e.g. bank M&A) and uncertainty (i.e. unsure relationship detected given only 
the names of banks). Details are available from the authors on request. 
4 Amadeus does not have debt information on Danish SMEs and Kompass does not have bank-firm relationship 
information for the remaining 11 EEA countries and Switzerland. 
5 We exclude banks if they are matched with five or less firms for simplicity and the removal of uncertainty in 
regression analysis. Most of the banks being removed are very small banks in each country and operate at very 
local level, firms matched with these banks have extremely insufficient accounting data, thus this exclusion 
process does not affect our regression analyses.  
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(Insert Table 2 about here) 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
3.2.2 Bank market power 
Bank competition can be measured using either structural methods based on the Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm (SCP) or non-structural methods based on the ‘new empirical organisation’ 
theories (Leon, 2014). The use of structural methods, such as concentration ratio and HHI, has been 
challenged by the concept of market contestability (Bolt and Humphrey, 2015) because structural 
measures may proxy market condition rather than market power (Ergungor, 2004; Stein, 2002). The 
theoretical foundation of SCP is rejected by Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Northcott (2004). 
Lapteacru (2014) finds that in the European market, concentration is not related to the market power of 
banks and competitiveness of a banking market. Bolt and Humphrey (2015) empirically show that 
concentration measure (HHI) is not statistically correlated with other non-structural measures. In 
addition, bank market power measured at country-level cannot capture the direct and distinct effects of 
banks with different level of market power on firms in a country. And, in regression analysis, country-
level measures matched with firm-level data could overstate the significance of coefficients as the 
degree of freedom is miscalculated (Ergungor, 2004). Hence, in this study we need a non-structural 
bank market power measure that is set at a disaggregate level.  
Three non-structural indicators can be calculated at bank-level, Boone indicator (2008), Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic (Panzar and Rosse, 19982, 1987) and Lerner index (Lerner, 1934). The Boone 
indicator has lack of literature foundation at bank-level and its theoretical foundation has been 
challenged by the causality between bank efficiency and market power (see Phan et al., 2016 and 
Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012). The H-statistics can be set at bank level but it requires a prerequisite 
that the banking market must be in a long-term equilibrium (Bikker et al., 2012; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004). We test the long-term equilibrium by using bank profitability models by following Athanasoglou 
et al. (2008), but our results suggest that the H-statistics is not a valid measure in our sample6. Hence, 
we adopt Lerner Index (see Appendix A for derivation) as a non-structural measure of disaggregate-
level bank market power, which considers the pricing power of a specific bank identified by the 
divergence between its revenue-based price and its marginal cost7. Table 4 shows the country level 
Lerner indices that are weighted averaged by bank total assets over time. For comparison, country level 
HHI is also demonstrated. A higher value of Lerner index indicates a greater market power and a less 
                                                          
6 Under equilibrium, bank profitability should be invariant with input prices. We test this assumption separately 
in each country and find that most banking markets are unlikely to be in a long-term equilibrium. Full testing 
results are available on request from the authors. 
7 Practical limitations include, first, pricing market power is not necessarily a proxy of competition since market 
power and competition can be, under specific cases, consistent with same direction (Bulow and Klemperer, 2002). 
Second, Lerner Index could be overstated because bank’s pricing decision is endogenously related to its risk 
preference on taking disparate projects. However, besides these imperfections, it is still regarded as the most 
applicable indicator at bank level. 
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competitive banking market. The values of country-level Lerner indices we calculated are very close to 
the World Banks’ release. Table 4 shows that for many countries, banking market competition level 
increased during financial crisis period but have decreased since 2011. German, Dutch and Portuguese 
banking markets are overall more competitive compared with other EU countries. British banking 
market has gradually become more competitive since 2010 but it is still less competitive than France 
and Germany. Results from Lerner Indices and HHI show different trends and orders in comparisons, 
and the coefficient of correlation (not reported) between HHI and Lerner index is less than 0.1, all 
suggesting that these two measures are not interchangeable and their implications are dissimilar. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
A criticism has been raised by Maudos and Guevara (2007) on the traditional Lerner Index calculated 
as in Appendix A that, banks with greater market power on deposit market have lower cost of funds, 
which is transferrable to lending market and thereby overestimate bank’s market power on lending 
market. Such a bias could be enlarged if a bank’s lending price is sensitive to its marginal cost. 
Regarding to this criticism, Maudos and Guevara (2007) and Turk-Ariss (2010) propose a solution to 
simply drop the cost of funds variable in the trans-log cost function (eq. A1, Appendix A) because the 
variable reflects the bank market power on the deposit market. However, Forssbeck and Shehzad (2015) 
point out that the solution could also produce bias. First, since the trans-log cost function must hold 
assumptions of homogeneity in input prices, their proposed treatment leads to estimations being carried 
out with only one input price, therefore underestimating the cost to output ratio and upwardly distorting 
the Lerner Indices. Second, dropping the price of funds variable as a solution is only applicable when 
the assumption that a bank’s marginal cost is irrelevant to the cost of funds and deposit rate holds; 
otherwise the measure would overstate the effect of lending rate. Empirical evidence has shown that 
bank market power at deposit market and lending market are not associated with each other (e.g. 
Williams, 2012; Forssbeck and Shehzad, 2015). We therefore measure the market power of a bank 
specifically at the lending market for robustness tests by following Forssbeck and Shehzad (2015, see 
Appendix A). 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Bank level control variables 
To control for the factors affecting credit supply at bank-level, we include bank size (natural logarithm 
of total assets), bank capital risk (equity to total assets ratio) and activity structure (non-conventional 
banking activities). We follow Delis and Kouretas (2011) to measure the non-traditional activities of a 
bank by its off-balance sheet items to total assets. In robustness tests, we follow Williams (2016) and 
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use the ratio of non-interest income to total bank income 8. In addition, we control for bank cost 
efficiency by cost to income ratio, and control for intermediary efficiency by applying the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA efficiency)9.  
 
Firm level control variables 
We control for firm level characteristics by firm size (natural logarithm of total assets), age (natural 
logarithm of firm age plus one), innovation dummy10, industry and legal form. Additional firm level 
control variables are related to SMEs’ external financing capabilities, such as tangibility (tangible 
assets/total assets), profitability (ROA), and SMEs’ demands for external financing, such as cash 
richness (cash/total assets net cash), liquidity (current assets net stock/current liabilities), trade credit 
usage (net creditors or debtors scaled by total assets.) and growth opportunity at industry level which is 
measured as weighted averaged sales growth rate (Behr et al., 2013) and weighted averaged ratio of 
intangible assets to fixed assets (Di Patti and Dell’ Ariccia, 2004) in robustness tests. 
  
Macroeconomic and banking market controls 
Credit supply side heterogeneities are controlled by aggregate-level variables, i.e. GDP growth rate, 
importance of banking section (domestic credit to private sector by banks, as a percentage of GDP, 
Delis and Kouretas, 2011), banking market concentration (HHI) and country-level growth rate of the 
number of banking branches11. We report definitions and sources of variables in Appendix B and 
descriptive statistics in Table 5. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
3.3 Baseline models, econometrics and model validity 
To investigate the effects of bank-level market power and other determinants on SME finance, we 
employ the following baseline models. First, we model the likelihood (Eq. 1) of an SME having access 
to bank finance with the dependent variable (A2F) coded as 1 if a sample firm in a given year has an 
amount of bank finance that is greater than 5% of its total assets. We also run a model on the total debt 
                                                          
8 For a review of the effects of bank activity diversification on bank profitability, risk, bank lending channel and 
SME cooperation, see Meslier et al. (2014) and Perera et al. (2014). 
9  Follow Tan and Floros (2013), we use input-oriented, two-stage variable returns to scale, intermediation 
approach techniques and Ji and Lee’s (2010, revised online in 2014) programming codes to calculate the DEA 
scores. The DEA scores range from 0 to 1, representing least to most intermediary efficient. Our cross-country 
evidence shows that British and French banking markets are most intermediary efficient and Portuguese and 
Slovenia are least efficient. Full details of generating DEA efficiency scores and cross country-year DEA score 
tables are available on request from the authors. 
10 The dummy variable is coded as 1 if an SME has ever had a patent or a trademark; 0 otherwise. Innovation 
activities carry more information asymmetries. One limitation of this binary variable is that the data is time-
invariant. We acknowledge that R&D expenditure could be a better indicator but only 8% of our samples report 
R&D expenditure.  
11 Studies such as Bellucci et al. (2015) and Han and Benson (2010) have documented the importance of physical 
branch to SMEs’ access to finance.  
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ratio (TDR) as specified by Eq. 2. The merits of separating these two equations are threefold. First, 
results can be interpreted differently from either the views of the probability of access to finance or debt 
financing ratio. Second, our descriptive statistics (Table 2) show big country and industry level 
variations between these two measures. For example, in some countries and industries, the proportion 
of SMEs that have access to finance (A2F) is high but the actual debt financing usage (TDR) is low, 
and vice versa. By estimating these two groups of equations with different dependent variables, our 
results provide a more complete picture of the bank financing conditions of SMEs. Third, we use 
alternative measures for robustness checks by employing different estimators (e.g. panel Probit vs. 
fixed-effects). 
 
Prob. (Yijct=1, Access to Finance) = α + βBbt + C1Fijct(t-1) + C2Mct(t-1) + C3B’bt + εijct                                             (1) 
 
Yijct (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆+𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎) = α + βBbt + C1Fijct(t-1) + C2Mct(t-1) + C3B’bt + (θijc) + (τt) + εijct                                               (2)
 
 
In the equations, Yijcts are the access to finance measures discussed above for firm i in industry 
j country c and at time t, subscript b denotes the matched bank with firm i. θijc refers to firm-level fixed-
effect (fixed-effects models), or industry-level and country-level dummies (random-effect models), and 
τt is time fixed-effect. Matrix B includes bank market power variables. F, M, B’ are sets of firm-specific, 
country-level and remaining bank-level determinants 12 . εijct is a disturbance term consisting of 
unobservable individual time-invariant specific effect, potential time-effect and remainder disturbance.  
Limited dependent variable models (LDVMs, eq. 1) are estimated by random-effects panel 
Probit estimator to retain the advantage of panel data structure on time-series difference. We also run 
fixed-effects Logit models for robustness test although it significantly sacrifices the number of 
observations. Total debt ratio models (eq. 2) are estimated by both random-effects maximum likelihood 
estimator and fixed-effects estimator. The maximum likelihood estimation fully maximises the 
likelihood of the random-effects models thus it is an ideal estimator when dealing with large 
observations. It also allows us to add time-invariant binary independent variable (e.g. innovation) and 
controlling dummies in the right-hand side13. However, the Hausman tests suggest that within-groups 
estimator is more consistent and thus we also run fixed-effects models. 
Before moving onto empirical analysis, we examine the validity of our data and model 
specification. There are two possible causes of endogeneity problems, omission of variables and reverse 
                                                          
12 Instead of using winsorization and extremity truncation, we manually detect and remove outliers from our firm 
and bank databases to ensure the quality of data without sacrificing too many observations. Around 0.25% of the 
original data are excluded from our sample. Our correlation matrix suggests that all independent variables are not 
correlated to the degree that causes multicollinearity concern in our models (>0.6). Full cleaning processes and 
the correlation matrix are available on request from the authors. 
13 Our results still hold by using either basic generalised method of moments random-effects estimator or Swamy-




causality, respectively. Several arguments based on which possible omission variable endogeneity 
problem can be reduced. First, control variables are added comprehensively according to corporate 
finance and banking theories and literature, therefore reducing the apprehension of omitted variables. 
Second, the panel structure of this dataset allows the inclusion of firm-level fixed effects and thus 
remove all time-invariant unobservable effects (Fungacova et al., 2017). Moreover, our empirical 
models are less likely subject to reverse causality endogeneity because, first, our bank market power 
variables are computed at bank-level from Fitch Connect database, while dependent variables are firm-
level characteristics coming from a different data source (Amadeus). It is therefore unlikely that debt 
financing variables can influence bank market power. This argument accords with Fungacova et al. 
(2017), Mudd (2013), Love and Peria (2012) and Leon (2015). Second, loans made to SMEs account 
for only a small fraction of banks’ businesses and therefore general bank characteristics such as market 
power or efficiency can hardly be affected by SME borrowing, especially that our analysis is comprising 
of a representative sample that is relatively small compared to the whole SME population. Third, our 
derivation of market power measure is based on bank-level data, and there is no evidence that SME 
financing behaviour would directly impact the variables formatting our market power indicators (e.g. 
Lerner index). Despite the above arguments, we perform in the robustness tests baseline estimations by 
lagging the bank market power variables and/or other explanatory variables by one year to avoid 
contemporaneous reverse causality. Additionally, we apply instrumental variables estimations and 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimations to correct for the potential endogeneity. 
Another econometrical concern could arise on selection bias where the regression results may 
reflect the pre-existing firm-bank relationship such that firms with certain types of financing behaviour 
tend to initially cooperate with banks with certain characteristics (e.g. market power, efficiency, size). 
This concern is only at horizontal dimension (cross-sectional) but not vertically (time-series) since the 
panel data setting controls the latter. To detect such a potential selection bias problem, we run an 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient test (ICC) to examine whether a type of bank is connected to certain 
firms with similar characteristics. The ICC shows how strongly for a specific attribute of units using 
the same groups of banks resemble each other14. The results suggest that the pre-existing bank-firm 
relationship selection bias is likely to be insignificant and thus further treatment (e.g. Heckman 
correction) is not necessary. 
 
                                                          
14 We classify ICC response group into three. They are firm-level variables that are unlikely to be affected by 
bank characteristics (e.g. industry, age), moderately likely to be affected (e.g. total assets, employees) and those 
likely to be affected (e.g. cash-richness, profitability). All variables are available from accounting information and 
we do not carry out test on estimated variables (e.g. Tobin’s Q). We do not categorise bank variables into groups 
because a bank itself uniquely defines a group of characteristics. Our findings show that SMEs with certain level 
of size (employees) in Cyprus and Latvia tend to work with certain types of banks. In addition to this, it is found 
that no other characteristics across SMEs are intraclass-correlated to any individual bank in all countries. Full test 
results and detailed explanations are available from the authors on request. See Donner (1986) and Marchenko 
(2006) for more information on the ICC. 
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4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Baseline results 
We present our baseline results in Table 6. The first three columns are limited dependent variable 
models (LDVMs, eq. 1) and the next four columns are panel data models (PDMs, eq. 2). For the LDVMs, 
Model 1 contains all control variables and Model 2 is the simplified model where some control variables 
that could bring econometrical concerns are removed. Model 3 substitutes the Lerner index by the 
market power measured at lending market. Panel data Model 4 is estimated using random-effects 
maximum likelihood estimator with time, industry, country and firm legal-form dummies, and also 
allowing the existence of time-invariant variable firm innovation. The last three columns are estimated 
using fixed-effects estimator where Model 5 contains all control variables15 and both time and cross-
section fixed effects. Models 6 and 7 are simplified versions16 of Model 5 and we drop the time fixed 
effects following Baum (2006) which suggests that estimating an equation from firm microdata implies 
that macro-factors such as GDP growth rate cannot be added in a model with time fixed-effects because 
such factors do not vary across firms. 
For our main interested variable bank market power, starting with LDVMs, Lerner index and 
lending market Lerner index have consistently negative and statistically significant coefficients. The 
intuitive conclusion at disaggregate level is that SMEs have less chance to obtain debt finance from 
banks with higher market power, or in less competitive banking market if the result is concluded at 
country level. The Lerner index has a mean value of 0.232, median of 0.234 and a standard deviation 
of 0.109 and the statistics are very close to a worldwide study (Love and Peria, 2014) and a European 
study (Fungacova et al., 2017). Using Model 1 as an example, a one standard-deviation increase in 
Lerner index leads to an approximately 4.5% decrease in the probability of having access to finance. In 
this model, the mean value of the dependent variable is 0.65, which can be treated as the probability of 
a random firm having access to bank finance. Thus, a 4.5% increase (decrease) is modest for an average 
firm-bank pair but it is more economically important for those firms that initially had less chance to be 
financed. Move on to the total debt ratio models, all the coefficients are stable in terms of sign and value 
and they are all significant at 1% level, indicating that bank market power at bank level reduces the debt 
financing of SMEs, worsens their credit constraints after controlling substantially for financing 
capability, credit supply and demand heterogeneities. Models 6 and 7 show that, with a one standard 
deviation increase (decrease) in Lerner index, the debt ratio of SME deviates approximately 2.3% from 
its median or 1.4% from the mean value. Furthermore, a one standard deviation change in Lending 
market Lerner index results in the debt ratio of SMEs deviates 3.5% from median or 2.2% from mean. 
                                                          
15 We remove profitability variable in the panel data model as it could present endogeneity problem and as shown 
in the panel probit models where the sign of variable is not as expected. The possible reason is that it captures not 
only the profitability of a firm (as an indicator of risk level) but also the retained earning a company has (an 
indicator of credit demand). 
16 We drop those control variables that could be subject to econometrical concerns such as bilateral proxy or 
endogeneity, full explanation is available from the authors on request. 
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Because the changes of debt ratios should be mainly determined by firm-level credit needs and their 
capability of financing but less dominant for banking sector factors, we conclude that the effect of the 
market power on the debt ratio is economically meaningful. 
The above findings suggest that bank market power reduces credit availability to SMEs at 
disaggregate level, supporting Market Power Hypothesis where market power enables banks to engage 
in anticompetitive activities (e.g. restricted loan supply, manipulated lending rates), thereby intensifying 
SME financing constraints. Our results also support Competition-Fragility Hypothesis where market 
power reduces the incentives of banks to invest in risker projects (e.g. SME lending). At country-level, 
SME credit availability is improved in a more concentrated banking market as captured by higher HHI, 
where concentrated banking market with less market participants or significant shares of top banks may 
benefit from easier regulation and supervision, resulting in reduced information asymmetry. The 
coefficients of HHI in baseline models suggest that concentration is more capable of explaining firm’s 
probability of access to finance but less economically significant in explaining the variation of total 
debt ratio17. We acknowledge the arguments on the relationship between bank market power and 
concentration in literature and therefore HHI index is removed in some baseline models to check if 
market power measure still presents a consistent result. We also perform tests by dropping Lerner index 
but keeping HHI and our results, not reported but available on request, are unaltered.  
In analysing other banking explanatory variables, we note that the coefficients of bank leverage 
are significantly negative in all models but if we treat the variable as an indicator of bank risk-taking 
level, the result violates the hypothesis that bank risk-taking promotes SME credit supply (Carbo-
Valverde et al., 2009). We therefore remove this variable in the simplified models and redo the 
examination on the relationship between bank credit risk-taking level and SME credit availability. Our 
results confirm that bank taking higher level of credit risk is associated with lower SME financing 
constraints 18 . Our baseline results also show that smaller banks are more actively engaged in 
relationship lending and provide more credit to SMEs, consistent with de la Torre et al. (2010). However, 
the empirical results in PDMs are not robust, we drop the bank size variable in the simplified model 
since it is found that the variable is moderately correlated with our bank efficiency measures. Next, we 
show evidence that bank credit supply to SMEs is reduced when they engage more in non-conventional 
businesses such as non-interest incomes regardless of how activity structure is measured (off-balance 
sheet item ratio or non-interest income ratio) and this is possibly because that non-conventional 
businesses would negatively affect the liquid asset available for lending. In addition, since non-
conventional business of banks is normally riskier, banks may diminish its risk level by engaging less 
in SME lending. Last, we show that the coefficients of bank intermediary efficiency (DEA scores) are 
all significantly positive, indicating that SMEs’ financing constraints reduce when their creditors’ 
                                                          
17 Results still hold if HHI is replaced by concentration three (CR3) or concentration five (CR5) ratios. 




intermediary efficiency improves. This supports the view that effective resources allocation 
(intermediary process) stimulates the amount and quality of business activities by reducing financial 
frictions and better channelling available credit, therefore encouraging economic development and 
alleviating business lending obstacles. The results of later robustness checks show that cost efficiency 
(cost-to-income ratio) can also relax the financing constraints of SMEs, supporting the conjecture that 
banks transfer their cost savings to invest in relationship building or obtain soft information that would 
both benefit SMEs to have better access to finance. 
Moving onto country-level variables, bank branch closure (or lower growth rate) reduces the 
access of SMEs to debt finance and increases their financing constraints, in line with our conjecture that 
branching closure has adverse effects on relationship lending and financial assistance, increases 
geographical restrictions for SMEs. We also show that when the conventional banking sector is more 
important than other sources of finance (Delis and Kouretas, 2011) and/or when the banking market is 
more developed (Larrain, 2006), SMEs are less credit constrained. As expected, the positive sign on the 
coefficient of GDP growth rate shows that SMEs demand more credit and banks are more willing to 
lend in the time of economic boom. 
At firm-level, our results show that SMEs are more likely to be financially constrained if they 
are more informationally opaque such as they are younger, smaller or/and involve in innovation 
activities19. Cash-richness and liquidity, which are used to reversely measure credit demand, are all 
negatively associated with SME credit supply, and our results still hold when their one-year lagged 
values are used. Tangibility as a proxy of collateral capability is a strong positive determinant in all 
models. We also show that a one standard deviation decreases (increases) in net trade credit usage leads 
to an increase (decrease) of approximately 15.8% in the probability of having access to finance or 3% 
higher in total debt ratio. However, there could be bidirectional effects as discussed by the classic 
‘substitution hypothesis’, whereby trade credit acts as a substitute to bank credit especially when a firm 
has less capability in accessing bank credit, or when bank lending is tightened or costly (Carbo-Valverde 
et al., 2016), meaning that a higher value of trade credit could be a result of inadequate level of bank 
credit accessibility. Hence, to eliminate this strong reverse causality endogeneity concern, trade credit 
usage is internally instrumented in the robustness tests, and it is otherwise removed from our simplified 
models given that a firm’s trade credit usage would not affect our bank market power indicators. Finally, 
SMEs operating in industries with higher growth opportunity are likely to demand more finance and, 
our results are robust irrespective of the classification of industry and whether growth opportunity is 
measured using intangible assets ratio or sales growth rate. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
                                                          
19 Age variable is criticised to be not ideal in panel data setting as it increases the same increment each year across 
all the firms and thus it is dropped in the simplified models. Because the dummy variable innovation is time-
invariant, it is not possible to be added in fixed-effects models and it is not ideal to be included in panel Probit 




4.2 Robustness tests 
We examine the robustness of our baseline results for the two equations (probability LDVM models 
and total debt ratio models), respectively. The first set is presented in Table 7 and second set in Table 
8. Control variables in all robustness check models are those used in above simplified models, unless 
otherwise stated. 
Start with the LDVM models (Table 7), first, we change the threshold of the variable ‘Access 
to Finance (A2F)’ to 1% and 10% of total assets (originally 5%). Results from first two columns show 
that bank market power measure is still significantly negative although the magnitude of Lerner index 
effect in the 10% threshold model declined, suggesting that bank market power effect is weakened for 
firms attempting to access to higher level of finance. The third model tests the robustness when an SME 
is treated as different entities across years by a cross-section Probit model. Pseudo R2 of 14.2% suggests 
that the overall goodness-of-fit is satisfactory and the significant coefficient of Lerner index supports 
the baseline results. Next, we adopt fixed-effects panel Logit estimator to run the model where the 
assumption of Probit distribution is not possible due to the Incidental Parameters Problem (Lancaster, 
2000). The fixed-effects panel logit estimator does utilise all the essential information on the binary 
variable although the number of observations drops to just over 130,000, because this estimator requires 
a value change of dependent variable after differentiating the model in two continuous years. Our 
baseline results still hold and the coefficient of Lerner index remains significantly negative. Next, we 
lag the Lerner index in Model 5, and lag both Lerner index and controls in Model 6 to address 
contemporaneous reverse causality, and our main findings remain unchanged. We also perform tests in 
these six models substituting Lerner index by lending market Lerner index and our baseline results still 
hold. Finally, Models 7-11 are estimated by Newey’s (1987) two-step pooled instrumental variable 
probit estimator to address potential endogeneity concerns. These results are for reference only because 
it cannot be set as a panel form. The selection of instruments is discussed as below together with panel 
data models robustness checks. 
 (Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
Moving onto the continuous dependent variable models (PDMs, equation 2) in Table 8, for the 
first three columns, we restrict our sample to those observations which have access to bank finance (i.e. 
greater than 1% and 10% of total assets). The number of observations declines gradually from 366,060 
(Model 6, Table 6) to 204,326, and the coefficients of Lerner index are all negative and significant. The 
fourth column sets the data in a cross-section form. We use Cochrane-Orcutt transformation regression 
estimator to address the autocorrelation concern as suggested by the Lagrange multiplier test and we 
allow for robust standard error to address heteroskedasticity. All results remain consistent even if basic 
OLS estimator is employed. Models 5 and 6 adopt growth-rate-based dependent variables where the 
former is calculated as the two-year moving average growth rate of total debt ratio and latter by moving 
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average growth rate of the amount of debt financing by following Ayyagari et al. (2016) and 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013). Results indicate that an increase in bank market power (less competition) has 
a negative effect on firm’s financing growth rate, essentially consistent with the baseline findings.  
One might argue that, as shown in Table 3, there are inherent differences in terms of the nature 
of financing demand and financing capability across different industries. Although control variables 
and fixed-effects have represented cross-industry financing habit heterogeneities and standard-errors 
have been tested to be clustered at industry-level instead of individual-level, we still perform Model 7 
by replacing the dependent variable by the difference of total debt ratio from industry weighted (by total 
assets) averaged level across years to eliminate the natural heterogeneities of financing behaviour across 
different industries, where a positive value (higher value) implies an SME accesses to more finance 
than industry standard and vice versa. Our results show that bank market power is negatively related to 
an SME’s financing level compared with its industry standard in which it operates, confirming the 
baseline results. In Model 8, we re-specify the panel data models in a form that transforms both 
dependent and independent variables into their one-year difference to capture the effects of real change 
x variables on y variables20. The change of Lerner index is significantly negatively related to the change 
of bank debt financing ratio. Model 9 accounts for omitted variable concern of unobservable bank-level 
factors by including bank-level dummy variables21 along with country and industry dummies in a 
random-effects maximum-likelihood estimation. Results confirm that our key findings on bank market 
power variable are not biased reflections of other banking effects. 
We further address the omitted variable and reverse causality endogeneity concerns as follows. 
First, we lag Lerner index by a one-year period (Model 10) and, both Lerner index and control variables 
by a one-year period (Model 11), to address the potential reverse causality concern given the belief that 
future does not affect past. Second, we adopt instrumental variable estimation technique22 to address 
the endogeneity concerns on bank market power and some control variables. We follow Fungacova et 
al. (2017), Tian et al. (2019) and Anginer et al. (2014), instrument disaggregate-level bank market 
power by its own lag transformation(s), lagged bank profitability, lagged net interest margin adjusted 
by nominal interest rate, lagged tier-1 capital ratio and a mixture of them23. These papers argue that the 
past levels of bank performance are a determinant of the acquisition of future market power, the past 
levels of bank’s net interest revenues as a share of tis total earnings assets could reflect as a sign of the 
degree of market power gained by a bank in terms of pricing power, and those banks with higher Tier-
                                                          
20 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach. 
21 Among the 504 bank dummies being included, only 11 of them (2.2%) are statistically significant at 5% level, 
possibly meaning that the omitted variable concern of bank characteristics is not severe. 
22 Be more specific, we employ a “two-stage-least-square instrumental variable fixed-effect estimator with robust 
standard errors” to perform the estimations. We also adopt a “two-stage-least square instrumental variable first-
difference estimator” which provides qualitatively indifferent results (not reported). However, one drawback of 
the latter estimator is that it sacrifices a significant number of observations.  
23 The correlation coefficients between the three instrumental variables (ROA, adjusted NIM and Tier-1 ratio) and 
Lerner index in our “whole bank” dataset are respectively, 0.22***, 0.22*** and 0.14***. 
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1 capital ratio would have a better ability to accumulate capital to build a buffer against failure and to 
set up barriers for other market participants on the equilibrium path. Results24 are presented in Table 8 
(Models 12-16). Third25, we re-specify the PDM baseline model into dynamic form and adopt the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM26) estimation technique to correct for the endogeneity of 
lagged dependent variable and potentially endogenous explanatory variables (e.g. bank market power). 
In Table 8, we adopt both 2-stage ‘Difference’ GMM (D-GMM, Model 17) estimator by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and 2-stage System-GMM (S-GMM, Model 18) estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998)27, with the Windmeijer correction (2005) technique to reduce the 
downward bias of standard errors. In addition to the lagged dependent variable, GMM allows treating 
other explanatory variables, in our case, bank market power and other firm-level controls, by using lag 
transformations as instruments. The lag length of these instruments is chosen on the basis of the 
overidentifying restriction tests for instrument validity, and error terms serial correlation tests28. All the 
above three approaches that aim at correcting endogeneity biases confirm the robustness of our main 
findings on bank market power variable. Moreover, the lagged total debt ratio enters the models with a 
significantly positive sign with a coefficient in the region of 0.5, signifying the dynamicity of dependent 
variable. 
Apart from the tests reported in Table 8, we also substitute Lerner index by lending market 
Lerner index for all models and results confirm the main finding. We also include the squared terms for 
the market power measures in the baseline panel data models and our results support a linear relation. 
For the static panel data models, we acknowledge that our sample may not satisfy the assumption of 
independent and identical distribution because the error terms for an individual during different time 
periods are often autocorrelated. We therefore run our fixed-effects models with autoregressive model 
of order 1 disturbance with two-step estimate of correlation, all results align with our baseline findings. 
                                                          
24 Several econometric diagnostic tests are conducted (reported), along with F-statistics of Sanderson-Windmeijer 
multivariate test, t-statistics of the instrument list from first-stage regression, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(not reported), conclude the necessity of IV approaches and the appropriateness of our selected instruments, except 
for the instrument ‘bank Tier-1 capital ratio’, which does not pass the Hansen test. 
25 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
26 GMM estimator is documented to be a rigorous treatment when dealing with endogeneity problems of both 
dynamic and static explanatory variables (Harris et al. 2013; Leroy, 2014) and it is also documented to be more 
efficient than the 2SLS estimator in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Bos et at. 2013). 
27 The D-GMM takes first difference of the original model, therefore removes both the constant term and the 
individual effect, and endogenous variables can be instrumented by lagged levels. However, a weakness is that 
the lagged levels are often rather poor instruments, especially if the variables are close to a random walk (Baum, 
2006). Therefore, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) modify the estimator in an equation 
system by including lagged levels as well as lagged differences (S-GMM). Roodman (2009) has shown that two-
stage estimator is asymptotically more efficient than one-stage estimator. 
28 If a second-order serial correlation exists, lags from period t-3 (and onwards) for lagged dependent variables, 
and lags from period t-2 (and onwards) for static endogenous variables, can be used as instruments (Bos et al., 
2013; Daskalakis et al., 2017; Ding et al., 2013; Baum, 2006, page 265). Based on the results of AR(n) and 
overidentifying tests, lagged independent variable is instrumented by its t-3 and t-4 transformations and, t-2 
transformations for endogenous explanatory variables. Longer lags are not included because in that case, the 
equations are overidentified. 
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In addition, we adopt different methods when estimating our Lerner indices (see appendix A), replace 
each of our control variables including bank variables by their alternative measures and run the baseline 
models with different combinations of control variables, and split our sample into different countries 
(big 4 countries vs. others) and years (pre and post 2010) in both equations (1 and 2). Our baseline 
results still hold29. 
 (Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
4.3 Heterogeneity tests 
Above baseline and robustness test results show clear and consistent evidence that bank-level market 
power has unfavourable effects on SME access to finance and financing constraints. Such effect could 
vary over firm and macroeconomic characteristics. In this section we further test the sensitivity and 
heterogeneity of such effects by using both grouping and interactive terms (Table 9). The merits of 
using both approaches are threefold. First, under some circumstances, it is not ideal to group firms or 
generate interactive term. Second, it provides robustness checks on the moderating effects as the exact 
mathematical forms are less important. Third, grouping allows robustness check on baseline models to 
see if baseline findings are driven by a specific group of sample firms. 
First, our grouping results together with interactive terms (Models 1-3) suggest that the access 
to finance of innovative SMEs are more sensitive to bank market power because innovation activities 
are recognised to be riskier and more informationally opaque and innovative SMEs usually have fewer 
tangible assets. We next group the samples into three from Low to High (Models 4 - 6) of the size-age 
index (SA index), as proposed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as an indicator of SME’s information 
opaqueness purely captured by firm size and age. A lower (higher) value of the index represents that a 
firm is more (less) informationally opaque. Together with the interactive term Model 7, we show that 
younger or/and smaller SMEs are more sensitive to the adverse effect of bank market power. 
We also group SMEs on industries (wholesale, manufacturing and non-manufacturing, Models 
8 - 10) and show that manufacturing SMEs are more likely to be affected by the adverse effect of bank 
market power because they are more dependent on external finance than wholesaling and non-
manufacturing firms. Next, we examine whether cash holding mitigates the bank market power effect. 
The sample is grouped into three from low (left) to high (right) cash-richness (Models 11 - 13) and the 
other one (Model 14) uses full coverage with an interactive team. The coefficients of market power 
enter from left to right with highest absolute value to lowest (-0.031***, -0.011**, -0.008*), suggesting 
that SMEs with higher level of cash as a precautionary investment fund are less influenced by the market 
power of lenders in terms of external financing. The interactive term model predicts similar 
interpretation. For example, considering a sample firm whose cash-richness level increases from the 
                                                          
29 All the above test results are available from the authors on request. 
22 
 
50th to 75th percentile, the marginal effect of market power on its finance increases, equivalent to a 
decrease in magnitude by 26%. 
In addition to firm and industry variations, the bank-level market power effects also vary over 
market level factors, such as the banking market itself. Because the sample contains only 19 EEA 
economies and the country-level variations are not as significant as worldwide studies such as Beck et 
al. (2004) and Love and Peria (2014), grouping approach is not ideal and therefore we use interactive 
terms in both equations (eq. 1 and 2). Our results (Models 15 and 16) show that the unfavourable bank 
market power effect on credit availability to SMEs rises along with the increase of bank concentration 
although it is previously found that concentration itself promotes better credit supply to SMEs. However, 
such effect is not economically significant as shown that the coefficient of market power changes from 
-0.030 in less concentrated banking market (25th percentile of HHI) to -0.033 in more concentrated 
banking market (75th percentile of HHI). The last two columns (Models 17 and 18) suggest an 
interesting result that the negative relation between bank market power and SME credit supply is 
stronger when the economic condition becomes better, inconsistent with the hypothesis proposed by 
Ruckes (2004) and Demiroglu et al. (2012). Our result is also different from Beck et al. (2004) and the 
possible reason is that when the economic booms, SMEs perceive better growth opportunity and are 
more likely to exhaust internal fund and finance externally. However, banks could be more profitable 
in expanding businesses with more transparent enterprises, leading to an increasing unfavourable 
marginal effect of bank market power on SMEs. 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
 
4.4 Additional tests  
By Table 10, we further examine if bank market power effect varies over the nature of external finance, 
i.e. short term vs. long term finance. Dependent variables are calculated as the short-term loan to total 
assets ratio (Model 1) and long-term debt to total assets ratio (Model 2). The coefficients of Lerner 
index are negative and statistically significant, indicating that bank market power has an impact on both 
SME short-term and long-term finance, being evidenced as an extended robustness check.  
 We control observations to those with access to bank finance (>1% of total assets) and define 
the dependent variable in Model 3 as short-term debt to total debt ratio (STDTD) to capture the 
proportion of an SME financed by short-term debt. Our statistics (not reported but available) show that 
the proportion of short-term debt (or long-term debt) in total debt vary significantly across industries. 
For example, some industries, such as wholesale and retail trade, and manufacturing, rely extensively 
on short-term finance because of the investment cycle differences and some rely more on long-term 
finance such as real estate and resources supply industries. It is therefore evident that there are strong 
inherent (natural) differences in terms of the mixture of short-term and long-term finance usage across 
industries and thus we address this by generating two additional dependent variables: the difference 
between a firm’s proportion of short-term debt in total debt and industry average (Model 4) and the 
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difference based on firm size weighted industry average (Model 5). For both variables, a positive (or 
higher) value indicates that an SME has a higher proportion of short-term debt usage in total debt 
compared to its industry’s standard and vice versa. The values are irrelevant to the amount of finance 
and the degree of financing constraints30. 
The coefficients of bank market power are statistically negative in all three models, implying 
that those bank-financed SMEs use less short-term debt or more long-term debt when the market power 
of bank increases. In general, due to the high risk associated with SME lending such as high uncertainty 
in long-run, information opaqueness and moral hazard, banks are more likely to finance SMEs by short-
term debt and thus SMEs have to rely on the renewing of short-term finance to invest in long-term 
projects. This brings inefficiencies to both parties, where SMEs are finding it problematic to invest in 
long-rum because of the short-term repayment, and banks are likely to incur more costly screening and 
monitoring processes and incur more transaction costs. Our results indicate that when bank market 
power increases, they are more capable of building relationship with SMEs, investing in soft 
information and improving techniques identifying long-term creditworthiness of SMEs. Our results 
suggest that banks with higher market power are more likely to cooperate with SMEs in a long-term 
relationship basis and thus the proportion of long-term debt in debt structure is increased. Unlike the 
discussion in our baseline models, this finding of increased market power promoting the long-term 
credit supply supports the Information-based Hypothesis (IBH) where in the presence of information 
asymmetries and agency costs, market power motivates banks to invest in soft information (private 
information) acquisition and build lending relationship, leading to a promotion of credit supply to 
informationally opaque firms, such as SMEs. Above results still hold if we replace Lerner index by 
lending market Lerner index, and if the sample is restricted to those SMEs who have a higher level of 
total debt ratio (e.g. >5% or >10% of total assets). 
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of bank market power on SME access to finance and financing constraints 
by using a matched bank-firm database that allows us to examine the effects at firm level. Our novel 
evidence from a sample containing nearly 80,000 SMEs being matched with over 500 banks in 19 EEA 
countries from 2007 to 2015 suggests that bank market power at disaggregate level impedes SMEs 
access to finance, worsens their credit constraint, bank competition promotes credit supply to SMEs if 
the result is translated to country level. The unfavourable effects of bank market power on firm’s 
probability of access to finance and bank debt usage are stronger for SMEs who are more 
informationally opaque or higher in cash-flow uncertainty such as they involve in innovation activities 
or they are smaller or younger. The unfavourable effects are also more prominent for those businesses 
                                                          




which are more dependent on external finance such as those SMEs operating in manufacturing industry, 
having low level of cash and liquid assets and when they perceive better growth opportunity and 
therefore being more likely to exhaust internal funds. These findings generally show support to the 
Market Power Hypothesis where lower competition increases financial constraints but reject the validity 
of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP). Our results also empirically back the 
Competition-Fragility Hypothesis and Ergungor Boot Thakor Hypothesis discussed in Section 2.2. We 
also show supporting evidence on Information-based Hypothesis where with greater market power, 
banks are more likely to engage in relationship lending as evidenced by more long-term lending issued 
to SMEs. 
For other banking determinants, results indicate that SME credit constraint is alleviated in more 
concentrated banking markets because concentrated banking market with less market participants 
or/and significant shares of top banks may benefit from easier regulation and supervision resulting in 
reduced information asymmetry and improved efficiency of asset allocation. The effect is more 
favourable in explaining firm’s probability of obtaining finance but less economically significant in 
explaining the usage of bank debt. Branching closure is found to have favourable impact on bank 
efficiency but it is positively associated with the financing constraints facing SMEs. At bank-level, we 
find that SMEs are more financially constrained if banks engage more non-conventional businesses and 
if they are less efficient. 
The implications for policymakers derived from our empirical evidence are that policies 
advocating banking market competition and suppressing bank from obtaining excessive market power 
would have a favourable influence on credit allocation to SMEs and therefore beneficial to the financial 
stability and economic growth. This could be important at this moment as the interest of banking 
consolidation arises in European countries and this may increase the market power of large banks. 
However, although the banking theories can have contrasting predictions (e.g. MPH vs. IBH), similar 
to Han et al. (2017), we have shown that theories are not always mutually exclusive to each other as we 
find that banks with greater market power are also more likely to engage in relationship lending and 
reduce the information barriers between borrowers and lenders. The policy implication is that when 
promoting bank competition, policymakers must also pay attention to supporting SMEs’ access to 
finance by reducing information barriers and building tailored relationship. Our findings are also 
consistent with the view that methods on targeting bank competition should be more diversified as 
traditional approaches such as imposing rules on changing the market structure of banks may not be 
useful (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009). Another suggestion we have for the policymakers is that, since it 
is found that many banking characteristics could have an impact on SME finance (e.g. bank business 
diversification, intermediary efficiency), it is noteworthy that bank market power could have direct or 
indirect relationship with these characteristics and these could have conflicting effects on SME finance. 
Therefore, it is important for policies not to let the loss outweigh the gain. 
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The limitations of our study and future research suggestions are that, our study could not 
directly observe the loan level details. Future studies of this filed can be improved if detailed SME loan-
level data from different banks in different countries can be made available. Second, our research 
focuses on a sample of 19 EEA economies but the other 12 EEA countries (e.g. Italy, Norway) and 
Switzerland are not included due to the lack of bank-firm relationship information from Kompass or 
other essential information at firm-level. Third, our financial constraint measure is based on the usage 
of bank finance but it does not capture the price side obstacle. High interest and non-interest costs can 
have detrimental effects on the survival and growth of SMEs and SMEs may suffer from excessive 
costs associated with satisfying their demand on finance, which may lead to an ex post moral hazard 
problem and financial instability. Last, future studies could further explore the determinants of bank 


























Appendix A: The Constructions of Lerner Index and lending market Lerner Index 
 
The Lerner Index is constructed following exact procedures as in Anginer et al. (2014) and Love and 
Peria (2014). We first adopt a trans-log total cost function as follow:  
 
ln(TC) = α + β1×ln(Q) + β2×(ln(Q))2 + β3×ln(W1) + β4×ln(W2) + β5×ln(W3) + β6×ln(Q)×ln(W1) 
    + β7×ln(Q)×ln(W2) + β8×ln(Q)×ln(W3) + β9×(ln(W1))2 + β10×(ln(W2))2 + β11× 
   (ln(W3))2 + β12×ln(W1)×ln(W2) + β12×ln(W1)×ln(W3) + β12×ln(W2)×ln(W3) 
   + δ×ln(netputs) + firm fixed effects + year dummies + ε                                                  (A1) 
 
Where total cost (TC) is the sum of total interest expenses and total non-interest expenses. 
Output (Q) is total assets or alternatively total earning assets. W1, W2 and W3 are three inputs that are 
cost of labour, cost of fund and cost of physical capital, measured respectively by personnel expenses 
scaled by total assets or alternatively scaled by total earning assets; total interest expenses scaled by 
total deposit and short-term funding or alternatively scaled by average interest-bearing liabilities; other 
operating expenses scaled by fixed assets or alternatively total non-interest expenses without personnel 
expenses scaled by fixed assets. Netputs include equity to total assets, net interest margin and net loans 
to total assets. Subscripts b and t denoting bank and time are hidden for simplicity. We apply the 
restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of degree on in the input prices to estimations. Measures 
mentioned at front are used for our main Lerner Index estimation and the alternative measures with 
different combinations are used for robustness checks. We run the regressions with full country-year 
coverage allowing for year and individual fixed effects in the full bank data (see Section 3.1). 
Alternatively, for generating robustness check variables, models are run within each country.  Random-
effects models and pooled data with year, country and bank specialisation dummies are also tested, 
results do not change. 
 
The marginal cost (MC) is the first-order derivative of the above trans-log total cost function 
with respect to output (Q), shown as below (subscripts b and t hidden): 
 
MC = ∂TC/∂Q 
       = TC/Q × [β1 + β2×ln(Q) + β6×ln(W1) + β7×ln(W2) + β8×ln(W3)]                                          (A2) 
 
We next take the marginal cost (MC) to the below formula to generate our Lerner index for 
each bank in each year. 
 




Where P is the price of outputs and MC is the marginal cost (eq. A2). Price is calculated as the 
gross income and dividend income together divided by total assets, or alternatively divided by total 
earning assets. When total assets are used as a measure of output, price (P) must be specified by gross 
income plus dividend income together divided by total assets, or total earning assets as the denominator 
of P when it is used also as output measure, this is to ensure the consistency of output variables. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, we also construct the Lerner index at lending market for 
robustness checks. The empirical methods of generating such a variable is exactly the same as the one 
used by Forssbeck and Shehzad (2015, pp. 2003) thus the details are not presented here. In brief, their 
paper assumes that a bank produces two outputs in different markets - loans and deposits, and the 
lending market Lerner Index is calculated as in equation (A4).  
 
Lending Market Lerner Index = (RL - RM - MCL) / RL                                                                               (A4) 
 
where RL is the bank lending rate reversely calculated as interest income to gross loan, and RM 
is the mean value of country-level nominal long-term and short-term interest rate. MCL is the lending 
market marginal cost, calculates as the first-order derivative of the rewritten trans-log cost function 
containing three input prices and two outputs with respect to lending market output. See full details in 
Forssbeck and Shehzad (2015, pp.2003). 
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A2F (access to finance) BvD Amadeus





Firm size BvD Amadeus





Trade credit BvD Amadeus
Growth opportunity BvD Amadeus
Innovation BvD Amadeus
Bank-level controls
Bank size Fitch Connect
Bank leverage Fitch Connect
Bank activity Fitch Connect
DEA efficiency
Cost efficiency Fitch Connect
Country variables
HHI Index
Concentration Global Financial Development
GDP growth rate World Development Indicators
Bank development World Development Indicators
Branch growth
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Measure of country-level banking market concentration, 
sum of the squared values of each bank's market share (total assets) in a banking 
market.
European Central Bank Data 
Warehouse
Sum of total assets of three (or five) largest banks in a banking market as a share of 
total banking industry assets.
Proxy of economic condition. Annual growth rate of GDP.
Proxy of the importance of traditional banking industry in credit market and financial 
development. Calculated as Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP).
Growth of the number of physical branches in a country from last year. Proxy of 
changes of SME's accessibility to physical branching services.
European Central Bank Data 
Warehouse
Measure on how diversified is a bank's operational structure in term of non-traditional 
business. Measured as total off-balance sheet items / total assets. Or for robustness 
check, percentage of bank's non-interest income to total income.
Proxy of a bank's intermediary efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
see section 3.2.3.
Fitch Connect
Ratio-based proxy for overall bank-level cost efficiency.                                                       
(total operating expenses / operating revenues)*100%
Proxy of an SME's need for finance. Measured as industry-level median sales growth 
rate or for robustness, industry-level  intangible assets to total assets.
Time invariant binary measure of whether an SME is innovative. Dummy variable 
coded as one if an SME has ever had a patent or trademark, zero otherwise.
Natural logarithm of a bank's total assets in thousands of dollars.
Proxy of a bank's leverage and risk level. Measured as (shareholders equity + non-
controlling interests) * 100% / total assets.
Firm's real age in years categorised into Start-up (0-3), Young (4-7), Middle (8-12) 
and Mature (>=13).  Or natural logarithm of firm's age plus one.
Proxy of an SME's cash-richness. Measured as cash & cash equivalent divided by 
total assets (without cash).
Proxy of an SME's collateral capability. Measured as fixed tangible assets scaled by 
total assets.
Proxy of an SME's performance. Measured as (EBIT + financial profit/loss)*100% / 
total assets.
Proxy of an SME's short-term liquidity position. Measured as (current assets - stock) / 
current liabilities.
Proxy of the degree of an SME's trade credit usage. Measured as net trade credit 
scaled by total assts. 
Fitch Connect and Bank Focus
Proxy of bank market power on lending market, see appendix A. Fitch Connect and Bank Focus
Natural logarithm of firm's total assets in dollars.
Definition
Dummy variable coded as one if an SME’s total debt is more than a threshold (e.g. 
5%) of its total assets, zero otherwise.
 (short-term loans + long-term loans) / total assets.
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Table 1: Bank, firm and industry distribution 
 
Banks by Country SMEs by Country SMEs by Industry
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Germany 1,682 48.47 UK 18,990 23.94 G 25,052 31.58
France 293    8.44 France 16,849 21.24 C 19,176 24.17
Austria 286    8.24 Spain 14,850 18.72 F 7,476   9.42
Spain 229    6.6 Germany 11,712 14.76 M 5,817   7.33
UK 218    6.28 Portugal 2,746 3.46 L 4,869   6.14
Poland 174    5.01 Poland 2,374 2.99 N 4,232   5.33
Portugal 131    3.78 Hungary 2,007 2.53 H 4,143   5.22
Netherlands 64      1.84 Austria 1,838 2.32 J 3,273   4.13
Ireland 50      1.44 Greece 1,714 2.16 I 1,632   2.06
Croatia 41      1.18 Netherlands 1,472 1.86 D 1,208   1.52
Hungary 41      1.18 Croatia 795 1.00 A 979      1.23
Cyprus 26      0.75 Slovenia 708 0.89 R 811      1.02
Latvia 22      0.63 Ireland 535 0.67 S 663      0.84
Iceland 21      0.61 Estonia 502 0.63 T 4         0.01
Slovenia 18      0.523 Lithuania 488 0.62
Malta 17      0.49 Latvia 474 0.60
Greece 16      0.46 Malta 228 0.29
Lithuania 11      0.32 Cyprus 131 0.17
Estonia 9       0.26 Iceland 118 0.15  
Industry codes: G: wholesale and retail trade. C: manufacturing. F: construction. M: professional, 
scientific and technical activities. L: real estate activities. N: administrative and support service 
activities. H: transportation and storage. J: information and communication. I: accommodation and 
food service activities. D: electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply. A: agriculture, 
forestry and fishing. R: arts, entertainment and recreation. S: other service activities. T: activities 






















Table 2: Dependent variable distributions across countries and years 
 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Avg.
Austria A2F 31.5% 31.8% 31.7% 31.2% 30.1% 29.8% 31.2% 29.7% 30.6% 27.6% 30.5%
TDR 11.1% 10.8% 10.5% 10.8% 10.2% 10.5% 10.9% 10.3% 10.6% 8.9% 10.5%
Cyprus A2F 95.0% 90.0% 92.7% 89.1% 87.2% 89.1% 91.2% 84.2% 86.1% 75.0% 88.0%
TDR 30.6% 30.5% 29.0% 33.1% 34.5% 34.0% 37.8% 33.6% 34.2% 38.3% 33.5%
Germany A2F 58.0% 57.0% 56.8% 56.2% 55.4% 56.1% 56.3% 56.3% 53.4% 45.5% 55.1%
TDR 22.8% 22.4% 22.5% 22.3% 21.6% 21.7% 22.3% 22.0% 21.2% 17.5% 21.6%
Estonia A2F 65.4% 61.7% 63.8% 69.4% 73.8% 72.5% 70.4% 69.0% 70.7% 69.9% 68.7%
TDR 20.0% 19.9% 20.4% 24.3% 23.5% 22.8% 22.4% 21.4% 21.7% 21.6% 21.8%
Spain A2F 78.1% 78.9% 79.5% 79.1% 78.6% 77.9% 76.7% 75.3% 74.8% 72.0% 77.1%
TDR 26.9% 28.4% 30.7% 30.0% 29.7% 29.1% 27.7% 26.9% 26.3% 24.7% 28.0%
France A2F 56.6% 56.3% 57.1% 57.2% 56.0% 56.5% 57.8% 56.0% 54.4% 52.4% 56.0%
TDR 12.2% 12.2% 13.0% 13.1% 12.5% 12.7% 13.2% 12.6% 11.9% 11.3% 12.5%
UK A2F 69.6% 70.5% 72.1% 71.3% 70.8% 72.0% 71.5% 71.8% 72.3% 70.6% 71.2%
TDR 24.2% 25.0% 26.0% 25.6% 25.5% 25.3% 24.8% 24.6% 24.3% 22.9% 24.8%
Greece A2F 75.9% 76.9% 76.6% 77.4% 76.5% 76.0% 74.9% 71.9% 72.5% 75.4% 75.4%
TDR 28.6% 30.9% 32.4% 32.1% 31.4% 31.4% 30.8% 29.3% 28.7% 29.6% 30.5%
Croatia A2F 69.0% 69.4% 63.3% 62.2% 64.1% 64.5% 66.1% 65.7% 66.6% 63.7% 65.5%
TDR 26.3% 27.2% 25.3% 25.3% 23.8% 24.5% 25.8% 24.5% 24.5% 23.3% 25.1%
Hungary A2F 33.9% 53.2% 55.0% 53.2% 52.5% 53.8% 51.6% 53.7% 53.8% 53.3% 51.4%
TDR 10.7% 16.2% 16.9% 16.9% 16.4% 16.3% 15.3% 15.0% 14.4% 13.9% 15.2%
Ireland A2F 81.8% 83.8% 87.6% 87.0% 86.2% 83.1% 85.1% 85.5% 83.3% 81.2% 84.5%
TDR 29.8% 34.0% 36.9% 36.5% 36.9% 35.1% 36.2% 34.4% 33.5% 28.3% 34.2%
Iceland A2F 79.5% 76.7% 80.9% 75.8% 90.7% 84.1% 82.8% 77.0% 80.2% 80.2% 80.8%
TDR 31.8% 30.3% 34.9% 33.0% 37.9% 32.7% 30.8% 30.4% 31.0% 28.5% 32.1%
Latvia A2F 89.5% 86.5% 88.7% 85.8% 82.7% 81.8% 81.3% 78.2% 77.4% 76.4% 82.8%
TDR 27.3% 27.2% 29.6% 29.4% 24.6% 24.7% 24.2% 22.5% 20.7% 21.6% 25.2%
Lithuania A2F 66.2% 69.4% 69.4% 70.6% 63.8% 63.8% 64.5% 62.6% 60.5% 59.0% 65.0%
TDR 22.0% 22.3% 23.6% 25.3% 21.2% 20.9% 20.2% 19.7% 18.5% 18.3% 21.2%
Malta A2F 64.0% 65.0% 62.9% 60.5% 58.7% 58.9% 58.0% 53.5% 59.0% 46.7% 58.7%
TDR 21.3% 21.3% 19.8% 20.3% 20.6% 20.7% 20.4% 17.3% 18.7% 13.5% 19.4%
NetherlandsA2F 84.0% 76.9% 75.0% 71.3% 72.0% 68.8% 69.2% 71.2% 72.5% 72.0% 73.3%
TDR 25.1% 25.9% 24.5% 21.9% 22.9% 22.5% 22.0% 21.9% 20.3% 20.8% 22.8%
Poland A2F 55.7% 55.8% 56.7% 57.5% 57.2% 57.9% 59.2% 58.8% 57.4% 56.1% 57.2%
TDR 13.7% 14.1% 14.8% 15.3% 14.4% 14.6% 15.1% 14.9% 14.2% 13.5% 14.4%
Portugal A2F 84.2% 82.5% 83.6% 84.6% 83.1% 82.9% 81.3% 80.5% 80.4% 79.7% 82.3%
TDR 30.5% 30.7% 31.8% 32.2% 31.7% 31.0% 30.0% 29.1% 28.0% 27.1% 30.2%
Slovenia A2F 84.5% 79.4% 82.2% 80.5% 80.8% 78.9% 79.4% 74.4% 72.0% 72.4% 78.5%
TDR 27.0% 25.6% 28.7% 28.2% 28.7% 28.4% 28.4% 25.7% 23.7% 22.4% 26.7%
Avg. A2F 65.2% 65.4% 66.2% 66.2% 65.5% 65.7% 65.7% 64.8% 64.4% 63.0% 65.2%












Table 3: Dependent variable distribution across industries and years 
 
Industry 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Avg.
G A2F 64.4% 64.1% 65.2% 65.0% 64.0% 64.5% 64.8% 63.8% 63.8% 62.2% 64.2%
TDR 17.9% 17.8% 19.1% 18.8% 18.4% 18.5% 18.6% 18.0% 17.8% 16.9% 18.2%
C A2F 68.4% 68.9% 69.3% 68.9% 67.9% 68.2% 68.0% 66.7% 66.4% 65.8% 67.8%
TDR 19.4% 20.2% 21.0% 20.8% 20.1% 20.0% 19.9% 19.3% 18.8% 18.0% 19.7%
F A2F 60.0% 61.0% 62.9% 63.2% 63.2% 62.9% 62.2% 61.5% 60.6% 58.0% 61.6%
TDR 20.7% 21.5% 23.5% 23.4% 23.2% 22.8% 21.7% 21.0% 19.8% 17.2% 21.5%
M A2F 55.2% 54.8% 55.1% 56.1% 56.6% 57.3% 57.6% 56.4% 56.1% 54.8% 56.0%
TDR 19.2% 19.4% 19.6% 20.8% 21.2% 20.9% 20.7% 20.1% 20.2% 18.8% 20.1%
L A2F 76.9% 77.6% 79.0% 78.9% 78.1% 78.3% 77.5% 77.6% 76.2% 72.5% 77.3%
TDR 35.8% 36.9% 38.7% 38.8% 38.2% 38.3% 37.4% 36.9% 34.8% 30.1% 36.6%
N A2F 58.3% 58.0% 60.9% 61.2% 61.3% 61.6% 64.0% 62.3% 61.0% 60.0% 60.9%
TDR 23.3% 24.4% 25.5% 25.8% 25.6% 25.5% 25.9% 24.9% 24.9% 23.8% 25.0%
H A2F 63.7% 64.3% 64.8% 64.4% 63.1% 63.5% 63.5% 63.7% 62.3% 64.4% 63.8%
TDR 20.0% 20.6% 21.7% 21.6% 20.8% 21.0% 20.9% 20.8% 19.9% 19.5% 20.7%
J A2F 48.7% 48.9% 50.3% 51.0% 50.1% 48.7% 48.9% 49.8% 50.0% 48.2% 49.5%
TDR 14.5% 14.5% 15.3% 15.3% 14.9% 14.7% 14.9% 15.4% 15.1% 13.2% 14.8%
I A2F 77.2% 78.3% 80.8% 81.9% 81.8% 81.3% 81.2% 79.8% 79.5% 76.6% 79.9%
TDR 34.4% 34.9% 36.0% 36.9% 37.0% 36.8% 36.5% 35.3% 33.5% 29.1% 35.0%
D A2F 69.1% 71.2% 70.5% 71.9% 71.2% 71.7% 72.8% 73.7% 73.3% 70.6% 71.6%
TDR 29.8% 31.5% 34.7% 36.4% 36.1% 35.5% 34.3% 34.7% 33.7% 33.2% 34.0%
A A2F 74.0% 76.4% 79.2% 79.1% 79.3% 79.3% 77.7% 78.8% 78.8% 79.1% 78.2%
TDR 22.3% 24.4% 27.6% 27.0% 26.4% 25.7% 25.4% 24.9% 24.2% 24.3% 25.2%
R A2F 64.3% 60.9% 63.1% 64.5% 62.7% 64.5% 64.9% 63.8% 61.1% 61.0% 63.1%
TDR 23.3% 23.5% 22.8% 24.2% 23.7% 24.0% 24.1% 23.9% 23.0% 21.8% 23.4%
S A2F 61.4% 60.0% 62.1% 63.7% 63.8% 60.7% 57.1% 59.3% 58.0% 57.3% 60.3%
TDR 21.3% 21.4% 21.2% 23.4% 25.0% 22.3% 19.9% 19.3% 18.0% 18.2% 21.0%
Avg. A2F 64.7% 65.0% 66.4% 66.9% 66.4% 66.4% 66.2% 65.9% 65.2% 63.9% 65.7%
TDR 23.2% 23.9% 25.1% 25.6% 25.4% 25.1% 24.6% 24.2% 23.4% 21.9% 24.2%  




















Table 4: Lerner index weighted averaged by total assets and HHI 
 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Avg.
Austria Lerner 0.191 0.146 0.244 0.266 0.224 0.230 0.207 0.252 0.246 0.223
HHI 0.053 0.045 0.041 0.038 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.045
Cyprus Lerner 0.278 0.264 0.251 0.283 0.279 0.267 0.309 0.332 0.382 0.294
HHI 0.109 0.102 0.109 0.113 0.103 0.101 0.165 0.145 0.144 0.118
Germany Lerner 0.128 0.044 0.156 0.192 0.204 0.192 0.192 0.199 0.203 0.168
HHI 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.025
Estonia Lerner 0.357 0.317 0.289 0.442 0.407 0.470 0.494 0.542 0.540 0.428
HHI 0.341 0.312 0.309 0.293 0.261 0.249 0.248 0.245 0.241 0.297
Spain Lerner 0.248 0.225 0.309 0.323 0.241 0.226 0.246 0.299 0.312 0.270
HHI 0.046 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.060 0.065 0.072 0.084 0.090 0.060
France Lerner 0.137 0.096 0.203 0.232 0.209 0.203 0.219 0.215 0.232 0.194
HHI 0.068 0.068 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.055 0.057 0.058 0.059 0.063
UK Lerner 0.259 0.144 0.296 0.312 0.260 0.228 0.228 0.231 0.198 0.240
HHI 0.046 0.043 0.047 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.046 0.043 0.047
Greece Lerner 0.258 0.213 0.259 0.251 0.222 0.145 0.178 0.206 0.202 0.215
HHI 0.110 0.117 0.118 0.121 0.128 0.149 0.214 0.220 0.225 0.147
Croatia Lerner 0.264 0.252 0.272 0.292 0.292 0.273 0.272 0.289 0.182 0.265
HHI 0.138 0.136 0.140 0.138
Hungary Lerner 0.281 0.219 0.273 0.318 0.289 0.216 0.224 0.152 0.256 0.247
HHI 0.084 0.082 0.086 0.083 0.085 0.087 0.086 0.091 0.088 0.085
Ireland Lerner 0.193 0.202 0.239 0.193 0.106 -0.091 0.160 0.231 0.287 0.169
HHI 0.070 0.066 0.071 0.070 0.065 0.063 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.066
Iceland Lerner 0.214 0.324 0.328 0.482 0.401 0.275 0.206 0.280 0.291 0.311
HHI
Latvia Lerner 0.307 0.247 0.178 0.204 0.270 0.279 0.329 0.378 0.384 0.286
HHI 0.183 0.171 0.169 0.155 0.187 0.175 0.189 0.182 0.194 0.180
Lithuania Lerner 0.311 0.252 0.252 0.232 0.297 0.350 0.443 0.451 0.460 0.339
HHI 0.116 0.120 0.118 0.100 0.093 0.103 0.104 0.100 0.103 0.109
Malta Lerner 0.321 0.225 0.318 0.364 0.356 0.401 0.390 0.402 0.344 0.347
HHI 0.118 0.124 0.125 0.118 0.120 0.131 0.146 0.165 0.162 0.133
Netherlands Lerner 0.107 0.116 0.054 0.138 0.144 0.144 0.160 0.172 0.194 0.137
HHI 0.193 0.217 0.203 0.205 0.207 0.203 0.211 0.213 0.210 0.202
Poland Lerner 0.305 0.278 0.283 0.326 0.339 0.320 0.331 0.359 0.308 0.316
HHI 0.064 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.059 0.066 0.067 0.060
Portugal Lerner 0.182 0.137 0.192 0.194 0.166 0.169 0.091 0.187 0.232 0.172
HHI 0.110 0.111 0.115 0.121 0.121 0.119 0.120 0.116 0.116 0.116
Slovenia Lerner 0.242 0.179 0.230 0.264 0.217 0.173 0.038 0.267 0.302 0.213













Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min. Max. Skew.
Dependent variable
A2F=1 (5%) 530,792 0.652 1.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 -0.637
Total debt ratio 524,370 0.213 0.134 0.234 0.000 1.000 1.191
Main bank variables
Lerner Index 649,464 0.232 0.234 0.109 -0.474 0.706 -0.845
Lend'Mkt.Lerner 646,697 0.777 0.875 0.279 -0.401 1.213 -1.262
Firm variables
Firm size 637,099 16.394 16.322 1.295 6.087 25.276 -0.198
Firm age 744,746 3.530 4.000 0.884 1.000 4.000 -1.755
Cash 605,870 0.170 0.054 0.313 0.000 3.000 3.970
Tangibility 622,936 0.219 0.121 0.247 0.000 1.000 1.371
Profitability 580,605 5.756 4.132 13.422 -99.782 100.000 -0.031
Liquidity 607,586 1.987 1.053 4.883 0.001 85.000 9.287
Trade credit 589,604 -0.068 -0.034 0.192 -0.717 0.552 -0.241
Growth Opp. 692,531 0.011 0.000 0.089 -0.167 0.254 1.170
Innovation 694,368 0.213 0.000 0.410 0.000 1.000 1.400
Bank-level controls
Bank size 661,291 18.971 19.316 2.140 8.400 21.843 -0.538
Bank leverage 661,009 0.060 0.051 0.034 -0.302 0.616 1.204
Bank activity 627,829 0.183 0.172 0.135 0.000 1.997 6.051
DEA efficiency 640,101 0.631 0.611 0.142 0.252 1.000 0.615
Cost efficiency 659,230 0.644 0.634 0.163 0.017 1.998 1.467
Country variables
HHI index 688,841 0.064 0.055 0.039 0.018 0.034 2.712
Concentration-3 608,028 67.398 66.016 11.218 38.562 100.000 0.567
GDP Growth rate 694,368 0.738 1.313 2.668 -14.814 26.276 -0.377
B'importance 693,458 122.807 114.774 41.922 36.077 253.458 0.172
Branch growth 688,067 -0.019 -0.016 0.039 -0.289 0.372 0.033  
Bank data are from the matched dataset, not the Bank-only dataset, hence duplicated observations are included. 






















Table 6: Main estimations 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Dependent variable:
Main regressors Lend'Mkt Lerner Lend'Mkt Lerne
Lerner Index -0.4119*** -0.1398*** -0.3622*** -0.0096*** -0.0143*** -0.0278*** -0.0168***
(0.0653) (0.0531) (0.0194) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0014)
Firm & industry controls
Firm size 0.2716*** 0.2923*** 0.3014*** 0.04903*** 0.0486*** 0.0481*** 0.0472***
(-0.009) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Firm age -0.035*** -0.0638*** -0.0240** -00150*** -0.0082***
(0.0106) (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Cash-richness -0.0350*** -1.1695*** -1.1640*** -0.0418*** -02579*** -0.0381*** -0.0381***
(0.0106) (0.2175) (0.2174) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Tangibility 2.7216*** 2.6073*** 2.5479*** 0.1607*** 0.1404*** 0.1215*** 0.1201***
(0.0419) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.002) (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Profitability -0.0146*** -0.0141*** -0.0144***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Liquidity -0.0385*** -0.0354*** -0.3521*** -0.0006*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002**
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Trade Credit -0.8745*** -0.8222*** -0.8546*** -0.8506*** -0.1086*** -0.1567*** -0.1564***
(0.0446) (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Innovation -0.0194***
(0.0019)
Growth Opportunity 0.1358*** 0.1962*** 0.2255*** 0.0959*** 0.0818*** 0.0712*** 0.0666***
(0.0521) (0.051) (0.0493) (0.0053) (0.006) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Country-level controls  
HHI index 3.4264*** 0.0778*** 0.0709***
(0.2794) (0.0202) (0.0206)
GDP growth rate 0.0243*** 0.0013 -0.0782*** 0.0002 0.0003* 0.0003** 0.0002**
(0.002) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Bank importance 0.0147*** 0.0115*** 0.0114*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0004***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Branch growth 0.0451*** 0.3905*** -0.2826** 0.0099 0.0121* 0.0216*** 0.0437***
(0.1485) (0.1239) (0.1290) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0071)
Bank-level variables
Bank size -0.1823*** -0.0080*** 0.0049***
(0.0068) (0.0004) (0.0014)
Bank leverage -0.7799*** -0.0494*** -0.0448***
(0.2557) (0.0109) (0.0115)
Bank activity -0.0959** -0.1904*** -0.2149*** -0.0113*** -0.0069*** -0.0093*** -0.0134***
(0.0385) (0.3595) (0.0358) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Bank DEA efficiency 0.4859*** 0.1651*** 0.1004** 0.0081** 0.0105*** 0.0178*** 0.0098***
(0.0671) (0.053) (0.0481) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0032)
Observations 322,256 352,640 352,731 359,633 359,633 366,060 366,116
Groups 62,952 63,432 63,433 65,177 65,177 65,769 65,770
Estimator RE-PP RE-PP RE-PP RE MLE FE FE FE
R2 45.24% 38.91% 38.98% N/A 80.63% 80.52% 80.49%
Access to finance (A2F, 5%) Total debt ratio (TDR)
 
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Constants are added but not reported. 
All country-level variables are one-year lagged to tolerate response lag of SMEs towards economic fluctuations (Leon, 2015), 
firm liquidity, profitability and industry-level growth opportunity are also one-year lagged to optimally correspond to their 
controlling effects. RE-PP, RE MLE and FE stand for random-effects panel Probit estimator, random-effects maximum 
likelihood estimator and fixed-effects estimator. Because there is no common method to measure the goodness-of-fit of a 
panel-structured Probit/Logit model, our calculation follows Stata guidance that we use a scaling measure that compares the 
log-likelihood value of model with the log-likelihood of the same model, but all variables in addition to constant are excluded, 
the principal is that log-likelihood would be zero when the model is perfectly fit. Results do not change if Models 1 - 3 are 
estimated using random-effects panel logit estimator. For the panel data Models (4 -7), standard errors are clustered at firm 
level, results still hold if it is clustered at industry or country level. The R-squared (adjusted-R2) for FE models include 
variations captured by firm fixed-effects. In the RE MLE Model (4) we include country, industry and legal-form dummy 




Table 7: Equation one robustness tests 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Dependent variable: A2F (1%) A2F (10%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%) A2F (5%)
Main regressors lag(1). Lerner lag(1). Lerner
Lerner Index -0.4294*** -0.1620*** -0.0652** -1.1470*** -0.4892*** -0.7261*** -0.3578*** -1.0654*** 1.0814*** 0.0055 -0.2528***
(0.0550) (0.0486) (0.0310) (0.1022) (0.0483) (0.0584) (0.0160) (0.1225) (0.0928) (0.0244) (0.0164)
Control variables lag(1). controls
Firm size 0.3655*** 0.4148*** 0.0303*** 0.9058*** 0.3945*** 0.3424*** 0.0942*** 0.1396*** 0.1059*** 0.1199*** 0.1233***
(0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0027) (0.0225) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0026)
Cash-richness -0.8476*** -1.1608*** -0.9298*** -0.9679*** -1.1023*** -0.8998*** -0.9856*** -0.9260*** -0.9634*** -0.9957*** -0.9751***
(0.0196) (0.0219) (0.0099) (0.0407) (0.0226) (0.0215) (0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0091) (0.0100) (0.0107)
Tangibility 2.2710*** 2.8132*** 1.0963*** 4.5824*** 2.8471*** 2.2682*** 1.2301*** 1.2247*** 1.1128*** 1.1109*** 1.0853***
(0.0384) (0.0344) (0.0121) (0.1071) (0.0396) (0.0371) (0.0128) (0.0193) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0127)
Liquidity -0.0274*** -0.0232*** -0.0408*** -0.0211*** -0.0296*** -0.0251*** -0.0312*** -0.0276*** -0.0304*** -0.0327*** -0.0336***
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Trade Credit -0.4983*** -0.6753*** -0.3740*** -1.7004*** -0.5468*** 0.0533 -0.1714*** -0.3912*** -0.0977** -0.0326** -0.0292**
(0.0347) (0.0320) (0.0156) (0.0681) (0.0360) (0.0345) (0.0491) (0.0576) (0.0483) (0.0135) (0.0145)
Growth Opportunity 1.2936*** 1.5097*** 0.0910*** 2.0837*** 1.4872*** 1.3347*** 0.8418*** 1.0301*** 0.9062*** 0.7439*** 0.6981***
(0.1024) (0.0909) (0.0319) (0.2170) (0.1058) (0.1039) (0.0360) (0.0356) (0.0331) (0.0365) (0.0391)
GDP growth rate 0.0207*** 0.0173*** 0.0107*** 0.0253*** 0.0234*** 0.0248*** -0.0147*** -0.0370*** 0.0245*** 0.0036*** -0.0076***
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0030) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0049) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Bank importance 0.0070*** 0.0080*** 0.0076*** 0.0069*** 0.0108*** 0.0110*** 0.0034*** 0.0046*** 0.0064*** 0.0056*** 0.0055***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Bank activity -0.0459 -0.0959*** -0.1962*** -0.1532** -0.1700*** -0.2126*** -0.1710*** -0.2650*** -0.2549*** 0.1239*** 0.1238***
(0.0392) (0.0341) (0.0174) (0.0712) (0.0385) (0.0436) (0.0186) (0.0258) (0.0182) (0.0216) (0.0245)
Bank DEA efficiency 0.1898*** -0.0823 0.1110*** 0.8781*** 0.4487*** 0.7351*** 0.6471*** -0.2868*** -1.5656*** -0.3530*** -0.2409***
(0.0549) (0.0597) (0.0332) (0.1109) (0.0552) (0.0656) (0.0682) (0.0380) (0.0383) (0.0223) (0.0248)
Observations 367,767 367,767 322,256 130,746 332,098 326,311 331,944 323,852 322,267 271,606 260,197
Groups 65,786 65,786 N/A 20,038 64,891 64,771 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Estimator RE-PP RE-PP Probit FE-PL RE-PP RE-PP Newey's 2-step Newey's 2-step Newey's 2-step Newey's 2-step Newey's 2-step
IV(s) for BMP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A lag(1). Lerner lag(1). ROA lag(1). adj-NIM lag(1). T1 ratio all (7-10)
P (wald test) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 34.50% 34.61% 14.22% N/A 41.38% 41.50% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Models 1, 2, 5 & 6 are estimated by random-effects panel probit estimator (RE-PP). Model 3 is estimated by pooled 
probit estimator. Model 4 is estimated by fixed-effects panel logit estimator (FE-PL). Models 7 to 11 adopt instrumental variable estimation technique; they are all pooled and estimated by 
pooled Newey’s two-step minimum chi-squared estimator (Newey, 1987). The row “Instruments for Bank Market Power variable” (IVs for BMP) lists the instruments selected in each IV-style 





Table 8: Equation two robustness tests 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Dependent variable: TDR(>1% assets) TDR(>5% assets) TDR(>10% assets) TDR TDR growth rate Debt growth rate TDR industry diff. diff(1) TDR TDR
Main regressors diff(1) Lerner
Lerner Index -0.0210*** -0.0193*** -0.0166*** -0.0176*** -0.0993*** -0.1899*** -0.0274*** -0.0097*** -0.0306***
(0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0162) (0.0174) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0035)
Control variables diff(1) controls + Bank dummies
Firm size 0.0397*** 0.0377*** 0.0336*** 0.0474*** 0.0609*** 0.3045*** 0.0425*** 0.0120*** 0.0468***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0009)
Cash-richness -0.0390*** -0.0379*** -0.0343*** -0.0119*** -0.1186*** -0.0721*** -0.0244*** -0.0060*** -0.0424***
(0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0015)
Tangibility 0.1430*** 0.1259*** 0.1060*** 0.1396*** 0.3280*** 0.1788*** 0.1518*** 0.0406*** 0.1673***
(0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0047) (0.0039) (0.0037)
Liquidity -0.0003** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0013*** -0.0009* -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Trade Credit -0.1168*** -0.1254*** -0.1313*** -0.1092*** -0.3251*** -0.2742*** -0.0940*** -0.0941*** -0.0782***
(0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0029)
Growth Opportunity 0.0838*** 0.0726*** 0.0599*** -0.0131 -0.0297 0.1118** 0.0807*** -0.0038 0.0957***
(0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0141) (0.0101) (0.0419) (0.0468) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0092)
GDP growth rate 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 0.0006*** 0.0072*** 0.0160*** 0.0008*** -0.0001* 0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Bank importance 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0009*** 0.0022*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bank activity -0.0078*** -0.0068** -0.0076** -0.0042*** -0.0028 -0.0038 -0.0039* -0.0035** -0.0067***
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0016) (0.0097) (0.0106) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0024)
Bank DEA efficiency 0.0316*** 0.0336*** 0.0319*** 0.0093*** 0.1017*** 0.2859*** 0.0299*** 0.0089*** 0.0324***
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0039)
Observations 278,128 239,227 204,326 279,473 287,214 287,230 331,391 297,991 366060
Groups 56,655 51,897 46,870 N/A 57,074 57,055 61,953 61,207 65769
Estimator FE FE FE PW&CO FE FE FE FE RE MLE
R2 80.44% 79.47% 78.35% 3.69% 20.35% 21.99% 79.50% 81.96% N/A  
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. PW&CO denotes Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt estimator (Model 4). The standard errors for all fixed-effects 
(FE) models are clustered at firm-level, although results do not change if clustered at country or industry level. Model 8 re-specifies the baseline model in a form that transforms both dependent 
and independent variables into their-one-year difference to capture the effects of real change of explanatory variables on explained variables. Model 9 is estimated by random-effects maximum-




Table 8: Equation two robustness tests (continued) 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Dependent variable: TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR
Main regressors lag(1). Lerner lag(1). Lerner
Lerner Index -0.0123*** -0.0383*** -0.0699*** -0.0567*** -0.2603*** -0.0395*** -0.0972*** -0.0437*** -0.0116***




Control variables lag(1). Controls
Firm size 0.0439*** 0.0317*** 0.0475*** 0.0500*** 0.0693*** 0.0498*** 0.0515*** 0.0427*** 0.0085***
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0066) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0006)
Cash-richness -0.0204*** -0.0195*** -0.0178*** -0.0197*** -0.0196*** -0.0167*** -0.0173*** -0.0259*** -0.0264***
(0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0094) (0.0015)
Tangibility 0.1676*** 0.0908*** 0.1638*** 0.1543*** 0.1157*** 0.1490*** 0.1440*** 0.0946*** 0.0102***
(0.0055) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0148) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0089) (0.0034)
Liquidity -0.0002* -0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0021*** -0.0012***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Trade Credit -0.1172*** -0.0184*** -0.1155*** -0.1256*** -0.1291*** -0.1185*** -0.1198*** 0.0135 -0.0148**
(0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0329) (0.0071)
Growth Opportunity 0.0741*** 0.0783*** 0.0481*** 0.0693*** 0.0376** 0.0470*** 0.0527*** -0.0305* 0.0243***
(0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0121) (0.0072) (0.0148) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0166) (0.0048)
GDP growth rate 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0002* -0.0010*** -0.0004 0.0002** -0.0008*** -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0006)
Bank importance 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0005*** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000)
Bank activity -0.0057** -0.0039 -0.0024 -0.0097*** -0.0096*** -0.0001 -0.0013 0.0078* -0.1195***
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0045) (0.0133)
Bank DEA efficiency 0.0176*** 0.0486*** 0.0622*** 0.0097*** 0.0133*** 0.0446*** 0.0033 0.0723* 0.0211**
(0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0097) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0102) (0.0036) (0.0440) (0.0104)
Observations 328,491 322,688 287,281 302,272 319,662 233,806 229,907 Obs. 268,379 343,548
Groups 64,497 64,358 63,169 63,053 63,626 54,247 53,989 Groups 57,455 63,703
Estimator FE FE FE 2SLS IV FE 2SLS IV FE 2SLS IV FE 2SLS IV FE 2SLS IV Estimator 2S D-GMM 2S S-GMM
IV(s) for BMP N/A N/A lag (1,2).Lerner lag(1). ROAA lag(1). adj-NIM lag(1). T1 ratio all (9-12) P AR(1) 0.000 0.000
P (K-P rk LM) N/A N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 P-AR(2) 0.017 0.090
WIT Wald F-stats N/A N/A 9243.25 869.04 15.15 1225.24 5323.24 P-(AR3) 0.578 0.345
Hansen J stats N/A N/A 0.2934 0.0471 0.1253 0.0000 0.1977 P-Sargan 0.111 0.113
R2 82.01% 81.51% 4.22% (centred) 4.44% (centred) 4.70% (centred) 4.06% (centred) 3.98% (centred) P-Hansen 0.495 0.715  
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Models 10 and 11 adopt fixed-effects estimator (FE). Models 12 to 16 are estimated by fixed-effects 
two-stage least squares estimator. The standard errors of all FE and FE 2SLS IV models are clustered at firm-level. The last two columns (Models 17 and 18) are dynamic panel 
data models estimated by two-stage “differencing” GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and two-step “System” GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). We present several econometrics diagnostic tests designed for endogeneity correction models, including p-values of Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistics, or in the table P (K-P rk LM)), F-statistics of Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics, or in the table WIT Wald F-stats), p-values of 




Table 9: Heterogeneity tests 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Dependent variable: TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR TDR A2F (5%) TDR A2F (5%) TDR
Sample group:
Non-inno. Innovative Full Low Medium High Full Wholesale Manu. Non-manu. Low Medium High Full Full Full Full Full
Regressors
Lerner Index -0.0240*** -0.0346*** -0.0070** -0.0407*** -0.0218*** -0.0163** 0.0099 -0.0255*** -0.0330*** -0.0188*** -0.0310*** -0.0109** -0.0083* -0.0306*** -0.4954*** -0.0228** -0.3214*** -0.0121***

















GDP growth rate 0.0369*** 0.0011**
(0.0040) (0.0004)
Lerner*GDP GR -0.0461*** -0.0065***
(0.0141) (0.0008)
Control and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 288,814 85,561 374,375 99,957 123,595 113,970 337,522 109,234 133,027 123,572 127,977 128,937 130,301 373,907 385,522 378,791 371,169 377,466
Groups 51,490 14,802 66,292 24,386 32,104 28,194 61,295 25,425 33,122 29,253 37,808 44,121 38,113 66,658 67,495 65,709 66,327 66,825
Estimator FE FE RE MLE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE RE-PP FE RE-PP FE
R2 81.22% 75.77% N/A 73.00% 80.21% 84.34% 79.10% 77.32% 75.57% 81.71% 81.28% 81.89% 80.16% 80.72% 31.02% 80.68% 33.65% 80.22%%
Bank concentration Economic growth
Yes, excluding firm size and age controls Yes, excluding growth opportunity Yes, excluding cash variable
Innovation SA Index (age and size) Industry Classification Firm-level Cash-richness
 
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. The SA index and cash-richness grouping trisection is done in the full sample and thus observations are not necessarily evenly divided 
in above groups. We exclude control variables firm size in Models 4-6, industry-level growth opportunity in Model 8-10 and cash-richness in Model 11-13. For all the models, results do not change if Lerner index 





Table 10: Additional tests  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent variable:
Main regressors
Lerner Index -0.0145*** -0.0172*** -0.0162** -0.0159** -0.0163**
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0076)
Control variables
Firm size 0.0207*** 0.0245*** -0.0108*** -0.0165*** -0.0080***
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Cash-richness -0.0140*** -0.0120*** -0.0289*** -0.0221*** -0.0290***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0044)
Tangibility -0.0033 0.1498*** -0.2447*** -0.2368*** -0.2341***
(0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0081) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Liquidity -0.0007*** 0.0005*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0015***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Trade Credit -0.0811*** -0.0247*** -0.0590*** -0.0819*** -0.0602***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0074)
Growth Opportunity -0.0004 0.0865*** -0.1530*** -0.0009*** -0.0016***
(0.0074) (0.0104) (0.0199) (0.0002) (0.0002)
GDP growth rate 0.0002*** 0.0005*** -0.0015*** -0.0002*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bank importance 0.0001*** 0.0004*** -0.0003*** 0.0038 0.0058
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0053) (0.0055)
Bank activity -0.0019 -0.0055*** 0.0085 0.0092 0.0117
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0056) (0.0086) (0.0088)
Bank DEA efficiency 0.0182*** 0.0152*** 0.0163 0.4168*** 0.2738***
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0140) (0.0437) (0.0438)
Observations 356,825 356,825 308,561 298,657 313,981
Groups 63,787 63,787 59,462 58,024 60,418
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE
















*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. WA is short for weighted-averaged. Other notes 
are same as above (Table 6). 
  
 
 
  
